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TENNESSEE LABOR DECISIONS: 1901-1954
JAMES C. KIRBY, JR.*
JURISDICTION
Any survey of a state's decisional law in the labor field should
include some reference to the jurisdiction of its courts over labor
controversies. There would be no separate body of substantive labor
law but for the intervention of Congress into employment relations
affecting interstate commerce with comprehensive legislation de-
signed to strengthen the worker in his collective capacity.' The
administration of this legislation by the National Labor Relations
Board provides the great majority of case law governing the employ-
ment relationship. However, that residue which may be regulated
exclusively or concurrently by the states is an important one, as
evidenced by the number of states which have enacted their own
labor relations acts.2
Express exclusions from national acts.-The obvious areas of labor
relations open to state legislative and judicial sanctions are those
which Congress either cannot regulate or has excluded from its legis-
lation. Since federal legislation is limited by the commerce power,
activities which are intrastate in character are subject solely to the
state's labor law as limited by other constitutional provisions. For
instance, picketing of a business which is outside the federal com-
merce power is no concern of the National Labor Relations Board
and any state limitation placed upon it need only accord with the
picketing-free speech doctrine developed by the United States Su-
preme Court.3
Supervisors, independent contractors, domestic servants, agricultural
laborers, and persons employed by a parent or spouse are not "em-
ployees" within the National Labor Relations Act and thus are
excluded from its coverage.4 Also excluded are persons employed.
*Associate, Waller, Davis & Lansden, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 49 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935),
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq. (1947) as amended by the Labor Management Re-
lations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq.
(Supp. 1953).
2. Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin.
3. See p. 81 infra.
4. Section 2(3). 61 STAT. 137, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (Supp. 1953). Board
decisions excluding persons from the Act's protection as supervisors include
A. S. Asbell Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 82 (1949); Ligget Drug Co. 80 N.L.R.B. 1099
(1948); Carolina Light and Power Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1948). See Levinson,
Foremen's Unions and the Law, [1950] Wis. L. REv. 79; Petro, True Super-
visory Status, 1 LABOR L. J. 754 (1950). Board exclusions of indepbndent
contractors include Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1949);
Southwestern Associated Telephone Exchange Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1948).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
by the United States and its wholly owned corporations, any Federal
Reserve Bank, a state or political subdivision thereof, or charitable
hospitals.5 Subject to the congressional purpose behind each ex-
clusion, these employees depend upon state law for the right to
concerted action and collective bargaining.0
The NLRB has also effectively excluded some situations from the
Act's coverage by its policy of dismissing complaints where it feels
that interstate commerce is so little affected that the purpose of the
Act would not be served by asserting jurisdiction. It has set forth
"jurisdictional yardsticks," based on volume of interstate operations,
which it purports to apply in determining whether to take jurisdic-
tion of a given dispute.8
Federal vs. State Jurisdiction.-Once Congress asserts its power
to regulate some aspect of interstate commerce with detailed legis-
lation providing a specialized agency for its administration, the
question arises whether it intends to occupy the field to the exclusion
of state legislative and judicial action. If so the supremacy clause of
the Constitution invalidates state law which would arrogate part of
the field and perhaps obstruct the effectuation of a uniform national
policy.9 The most controversial problem in the labor field today is
the extent to which Congress has "pre-empted" the regulation of
labor relations in industries affecting interstate commerce. Since
the Wagner Act did not outlaw any form of concerted employee
action, there was no basis for argument that the states were excluded
from acting in this area.10 Employers freely used state courts for
injunctive relief from coercive and unlawful union activity.
5. Section 2(2). 61 STAT. 137, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (Supp. 1953).
6. For a case enjoining picketing to organize supervisors as contrary to
state policy, see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d
721 (Cal. 1953). For the application of a state labor relations act to charitable
hospitals see Utah Labor Relations Board v. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 P.2d
520 (Utah 1951).
7. See Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
8. In July, 1954, the Board issued a new set of standards designed to increase
the restrictions on its acceptance of jurisdiction. These may be found in 1
CCH L. LAw REP. 1 1615 (Report No. 324, Aug. 19, 1954). In splitting over
revising its old jurisdictional yardsticks, a majority of the Board stated that
the new yardsticks would "reduce the Board's case load by no more than 10
per cent and in terms of employees will affect no more than 1 per cent of
the total number of employees subject to the broadest reach of the Board's
legal jurisdiction." According to Member Murdock, who strongly opposed
the jurisdictional changes, "it seems probable that at least 25 per cent and
perhaps as much as 33 1/3 per cent of our past jurisdiction is now eliminated,"
Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1954).
9. Napier v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
10. Wagner Act regulation was sufficient for Federal preemption of the
areas of employer unfair practices; regulation of peaceful strikes, International
Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); employee choice of bargaining repre-
sentatives, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U.S.
767 (1947), Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); and the negotiation of collec-




However, the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act brought detailed
prohibition of certain union unfair labor practices and the effect
of this legislation on state power is not yet resolved.1 State statutes
or decisions clearly may not legalize conduct which is outlawed by
federal law. But what of state law which is consistent with federal
law? And may the states go beyond Taft-Hartley and regulate ac-
tivity which that Act neither expressly condemns nor expressly
privileges?
These questions were brought into sharp focus by the much dis-
cussed decision of the United States Supreme Court in Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union.12 The defendant union had
been enjoined by a lower Pennsylvania court from engaging in
organizational picketing' 3 where it represented none of the com-
plaining employer's employees, on the theory that the pickets sought
to induce the employer to violate the state's labor relations act. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the picketing
was within the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor
practices. The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in the Garner case did not consider
whether the union's conduct violated federal law and apparently re-
garded this as immaterial. It noted that the case was one of which
the NLRB would have assumed jurisdiction and reasoned that a
prime purpose of the Board-the application of uniform national policy
in labor disputes-would be defeated if disputes within the Board's
purview could be subjected to the differing remedies and possibly
conflicting adjudications of state courts.
The failure of the Garner opinion to consider the legality of the
picketing under Taft-Hartley indicates that the Board's exclusive
jurisdiction is not limited to union conduct outlawed by the Act.
The opinion contains strong language which indicates that the Act
is to be construed as privileging any peaceful picketing which is not
forbidden by Section 8 (b) (4).14 Whether stranger picketing for or-
11. Among the vast law review comment on the subject the most compre-
hensive treatment is Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1297 (1954). See also e.g., Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regula-
tion, 1 J. PuBLIc L. 97 (1952); Petro, Participation by the States in the En-
forcement and Development of National Labor Policy, 28 NOTRE DAmwm LAw.
1 (1952); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
3 LABOR L. J. 750 (1952).
12. 346 U.S. 485 (1953), 7 VAND. L. RE V. 422 (1954).
13. Organizational picketing is directed at the picketed employees and urges
them to join the union. Recognition picketing is directed at the employer and
seeks to induce him to recognize the union as bargaining agent. The legal
status of such picketing when it is conducted by a minority union or a stranger
union (one which represents none of the employees in the unit) is one of
the most difficult and controversial problems in current labor law. See note
15 infra, and Petro and Koretz, Labor Relations Law (1953 Ann. Surv. Am.
Law), 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 362 (1954).
14. "The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types
of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
19541
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ganization violates Taft-Hartley is an unsettled and highly contro-
versial issue.15 If the Court subsequently holds such picketing to
be an unfair practice, the way is open to limit the Garner case to a
holding that state jurisdiction is ousted only where federal law is
consistent with state law. Some state courts have so construed the
case and have continued to take jurisdiction over picketing which is
not specifically forbidden by federal law.';
The Garner decision has many implications too far-reaching for full
discussion here. It remains for congressional action, or a case by case
judicial process, to define the line between state and federal power.
The waters were muddied further by United Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Construction Corp.,'7 which held that a state court could
entertain an employer's damage action against a union which had
intimidated his employees and forced him to abandon construction
projects.' s Although the union's conduct was an unfair practice
under federal law and the NLRB could have issued a cease and
desist order, the Board afforded no substitute remedy for relief by
damages.19 The Garner case was distinguished as holding that "pre-
ventive procedures prescribed by Congress precluded conflicting state
procedure to the same end."
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the national Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained
by its prescribed process to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is im-
plicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use
the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat
designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if
the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which
the federal Act prohibits." Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953).
15. The Board holds that such picketing by a minority or stranger union
may not be restrained unless there is a certified union representing the em-
ployees. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 80 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1948);
Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1948). At least one federal circuit
court has disagreed. Capital Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). The lower Pennsylvania court in the Garner
case based its right to enjoin the picketing upon the Board's holdings that
such conduct was not forbidden by Taft-Hartley. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs and Helpers Union, 21 CCH LAB. CAS. 67,034 (Ct. Com. PI., Dauphin
Co., Pa. 1951). In reversing, the state supreme court reasoned that such
picketing is an unfair labor practice under Taft-Hartley. 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d
893 (1953).
16. See e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, 265 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1954),
cert. granted, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 921 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1954); M & M Woodworking
Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 26 CCH LAB. CAS. if
68,767 (Cir. Ct. Multnomah Co., Ore. 1954)1; Milwaukee Boston Store Co.
v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 25 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 68,310
(Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co., Wis. 1954). State court decisions prior to the Garner
case are collected at 32 A.L.R. 2d 1026 (1953).
17. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
18. An analogous Tennessee case is McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union,
36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (E.S. 1952) in which a nonunion employee re-
covered damages from a union for personal injuries caused by picket-line
violence.
19. The Board may only order reinstatement and back pay, and the latter
only in discrimination cases. See Note, 51 COL. L. REV. 508 (1951).
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It should not be readily assumed from the Laburnum case, however,
that federal preemption is limited to situations where the Board and
state courts afford equivalent remedies. Laburnum involved threat-
ened violence-conduct which is tortious at common law whether
it occurs in a labor dispute or elsewhere. The Garner case had re-
affirmed earlier decisions which upheld the states' traditional power
over public safety and order,20 and the facts of Laburnum would
have justified injunctive relief by the state court. It is unlikely that
the Supreme Court would allow a state court damage action for injury
caused by peaceful picketing such as the Garner case involved. 21
While less drastic than injunctive relief, the prospect of liability for
damages in a state court would be something of a deterrent to peace-
ful picketing which should be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
This leads to the question of Garner's effect on the picketing-free
speech decisions which permit a state to enjoin picketing which has
an illegal objective. The Pennsylvania court had enjoined the pick-
eting here because it sought a violation of the state's labor relations
act. Does the Supreme Court intend to overrule cases like Giboney22
and Ritter's Cafe?2 3 In both these cases peaceful secondary picketing
to enforce a boycott was enjoined under the states' antitrust laws
and the Court sustained them. The Ritter case was decided before
Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited certain boycotts.
Under Garner's reasoning, this may have legalized those not forbidden.
Or under Garner as distinguished by the Laburnum case, this may
merely preclude state preventive procedures. The Giboney case was
20. The following passage from the Garner opinion is its only hint as to
permissible areas for state action:
"This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Re-
lations Board is without express power to prevent and which therefore either
is governable by the state or it is entirely ungoverned. In such cases we
have declined to find an implied exclusion of state powers. International
Union, U.A.W., A.F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245, 254.... Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening
of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We
have held that the state still may exercise its historic powers over such
traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets
and highways. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and
Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740, 749. . . . Nothing suggests that the activity enjoined threatened a
probable breach of the state's peace or would call for extraordinary police
measures by state or city authority. Nor is there any suggestion that petiti-
oners' plea of federal jurisdiction and preemption was frivolous and dilatory,
or that the federal Board would decline to exercise its powers once its juris-
diction was invoked." Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union,
346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
21. Unless the Taft-Hartley Act is to be given the anomolous effect of
merely stripping state courts of injunctive power in labor disputes, thus mak-
ing it a sort of Norris-LaGuardia Act for the states. Cf. Benjamin v. Foidl,
26 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 68,792 (Pa. 1954).
22. Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). However, it
does not appear in this case that interstate commerce was affected. Likely it
was not, since retail ice dealers were involved.
23. Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
1954 ]
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decided in 1949 after Taft-Hartley gave rise to the preemption doc-
trine, but the question was not raised. The resolution of this question
may depend upon analysis of the particular state law involved. It has
been suggested that state statutes or common law rules which are
aimed at labor relations as such should not be applied to labor dis-
putes governed by federal law. But if union conduct violates a general
state law relating to the protection of persons and property, the fact
that the violation occurs in connection with concerted employee
action should not insulate it from state sanctions.
24
The preemption doctrine raises a perplexing problem in the "no
man's land" of labor relations created by the NLRB's policy of de-
clining to exercise its jurisdiction in disputes having an insufficient
effect on commerce.2 5 Since the Board acts under a Congressional
delegation of power, its jurisdictional yardsticks should be given the
effect of defining the excluded industries as intrastate commerce so
far as labor disputes are concerned. The difficulty arises from the
Board's failure in some instances to follow its own standards in taking
jurisdiction.26 It may be impossible in a given case to determine
whether the Board will take jurisdiction of a dispute and thus "pre-
empt" it from state sanctions.
What of actions in a state court based on breach of a collective
bargaining agreement? Since breach of a collective agreement is not
of itself an unfair labor practice, there is no remedy with the Board,
and state courts have traditionally entertained such actions. 27 But
a preemption issue may be raised by Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act2 which creates a federal substantive right to the performance of
such agreements. It is unlikely that this ousts state courts of juris-
diction of such actions, but there is a danger of conflicting decisions
if state law is applied in suits in state courts.
29
The advent of preemption should not disturb any Tennessee deci-
sions. In Manning v. Friedelson9 the state Supreme Court refused to
entertain a suit to enjoin the Regional Director of the NLRB from
an improper distribution as trustee of a back pay award. It noted the
Board's exclusive power to prevent unfair labor practices under the
24. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAv. L. Rav. 1297,
1321 (1954).
25. See p. 74, supra.
26. The 'Board has declined jurisdiction over the hotel industry and refused
to apply its jurisdictional yardsticks to it. Hotel Association of St. Louis,
92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951).
27. See e.g. cases collected at 18 A.L.R. 2d 352 (1951).
28. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (Supp. 1953).
29. Compare Shirley-Herman Co. v. Int'l Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1950); Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Construction Co.,
193 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951); with Patterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Paper Makers, 191 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1951); General Building
Contractors Ass'n v. Local Union No. 542, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952). See
cases at 17 A.L.R. 2d 614 (1951) and Cox, supra note 24 at 1335-1339.
30. 175 Tenn. 576, 136 S.W.2d 510 (1940).
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Wagner Act and held that the employees should apply to the Board
for a construction of its order granting back pay. In 1944 the Oliver
case31 considered an employees' suit complaining of a discharge under
a War Labor Board maintenance-of-membership clause. It was held
that the alleged discriminatory discharge was an unfair labor practice
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National. Labor Relations
Board. In 1948, the state Supreme Court considered a case identical
with the Garner case. The union was picketing for recognition al-
though it had no members among the complainant's employees. Pre-
emption was not discussed but the court interpreted decisions of the
United States Supreme Court to hold that it could not prohibit peace-
ful picketing merely because of the absence of a "labor dispute. '32
Robinson v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers"3
involved a strike apparently caused by the employer's discharge of
employees who had designated the defendant union as bargaining
representative. The chancellor had enjoined picketing on the theory
that the union lost the right to picket by striking without attempting
to bargain in good faith. He found the union guilty of an unfair labor
practice, apparently by a misapplication of the 60-day waiting period
in Section 9 (d) (1) of the Act. The court of appeals held that the
matters were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board and it would not usurp the Board's functions by at-
tempting to enforce the Act.
3 4
In 1953 the Tennessee Supreme Court summarized its position on
limitations on its jurisdiction to enjoin picketing. It stated:
"We think the Chancellor was correct in holding that he had no juris-
diction to determine whether or not the union was qualified to act as
bargaining agent for the company's employees. This is strictly within
the scope and purview of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley); nor has the court any authority to determine whether
or not an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice, or if any strike
is lawful or unlawful....
"This Court is not concerned with the question of causes which give
rise to a strike, and not until strikers are guilty of acts which result in
irreparable damage to property, will a court of chancery issue an injunc-
tion to restrain the commission of such unlawful acts."3 5
31. Oliver v. Local or Subordinate Lodge No. 56, Int'l Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers, 182 Tenn. 236, 185 S.W.2d 525 (1944).
32. Ira Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402, 215 S.W.2d 801 (1948).
33. 20 CCH LAB. CAS. 11 66,463 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
34. But see Chattanooga Blow Pipe & Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers,
Local 51, 12 CCH LAB. CAS. 63,706 (Ch. Ct. Shelby Co., April 1, 1947), a
clearly erroneous decision. It enjoined picketing for a closed-shop contract
on the theory that the union, by failure to seek a contract since its last one
expired in 1939, lost its bargaining rights by laches and was therefore now
committing an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act.
35. Lodge Mfg. Co. v. Gilbert, 260 S.W.2d 154. 156 (Tenn. 1953).
1954]
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The court then approved an injunction of violence, intimidation and
mass picketing, limiting the number of pickets to one.
In Broome v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.30 the Tennessee Supreme
Court refused to take jurisdiction of a suit for wrongful discharge
under a collective agreement subject to the Railway Labor Act. Al-
though it would have jurisdiction of an action at law for damages, 7
it could not take jurisdiction of an equity action to compel reinstate-
ment. The latter action affects the future status of all employees in
the bargaining unit, and, unlike a damage action, seeks relief which
the Railway Adjustment Board is empowered to administer. There-
fore state jurisdiction yields.
THE LABOR INJUNCTION
The availability in a state court of an injunction against unlawful
picketing may well be of vital importance to an employer. Even
though irreparable injury may be threatened to his business, he may
find that the obstacles of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deny access to
Federal courts and that the procedures of the NLRB are either in-
adequate or too slow to be of real assistance to him.38 Any right he
may have to such relief is of course subject to the usual equity limi-
tations. But it is also clouded by two of the most vexing and con-
ceptually difficult problems in this field, the extent to which Congress
has preempted the field of interstate labor relations and the "picket-
ing-free speech" doctrine developed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Picketing for unlawful objective.-What is probably the first re-
ported decision involving an injunction of picketing in Tennessee is
Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists Local Union No. 14,39 decided in 1901.
In that case a federal circuit judge applied Tennessee's "enticement
statute"4 0 and enjoined the defendant union from inducing by any
method-picketing, persuasion or otherwise-the breach by plain-
tiff's apprentices of their four-year contracts of employment. The
remainder of the sweeping injunction which was issued against the
union's activities is not material here since Tennessee law was not
involved. The enticement statute has not been invoked again to curb
36. 194 Tenn. 249, 250 S.W.2d 93 (1952). For a discussion of this case see
Sanders, Labor Relations-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1193, 1197
(1953).
37. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953);
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950).
38. It has even been held that it would deny due process to exclude a
picketed employer from local courts and limit him to the Board's procedures.
Winkleman Bros. v. Local Union No. 329, 22 CCH LAB. CAS. 67,262 (Cir.
Ct., Wayne Co., Mich. (1952). See also State ex rel. Tidewater Shaver Barge
Lines v. Dobson, 195 Ore. 533, 245 P.2d 903 (1952).
39. 111 Fed. 49 (Tenn. 1901). See p. 98 infra.
40. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8559-8560 (Williams 1934).
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concerted employee action, but neither has it been rejected. It is
still the law of Tennessee and a separate section of this article is
devoted to it.
41
Apparently the Tennessee courts did not consider an injunction
of peaceful picketing until 1939 when Lyle v. Local No. 452, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters42 was decided by the state Supreme Court. There
the defendant butchers' union picketed a small grocery operated by
Lyle, his wife, and one clerk who did no butcher's work. Its object
was to induce Lyle to join the union and conform his wages and hours
of business to union standards. During two months of such picketing
the complainant's business had fallen off one third. The Tennessee
Supreme Court held that Lyle was entitled to an injunction and in
substance applied the prima-facie tort theory,43 reasoning that the
right to conduct a business is a property right protected by the com-
mon law, and that "so-called peaceful picketing" by those in the
positions of the defendants was an unjustifiable interference with that
right. The court did not regard the picketing of a sole proprietor as
a legitimate "labor dispute" and relied on a number of decisions
prohibiting concerted employee action against a party with whom they
have no contractual relation. One of these cases was the decision of
the Illinois appellate court in Swing v. American Federation of
Labor.
44
In 1941 the Swing case was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court 45 in an application of the picketing-free speech doctrine in-
itiated in Thornhill v. Alabama46 in 1940. In 1948 the Tennessee Su-
preme Court repudiated the Lyle case to the extent required to allow
peaceful picketing by a union for recognition where it represented a
majority of the employees.47 Soon thereafter it expressly overruled
the Lyle case in permitting a union to picket for organization or rec-
ognition even though it represented no employees in the unit.
48
The requiem for the Lyle case was sung too soon. The Swing de-
cision had held that a state could not prohibit picketing by a stranger
union for recognition merely because of the absence of an employer-
employee relationship. It was soon established, as the picketing-free
speech doctrine began to wither, that a state could enjoin picketing
which had an objective illegal under- its law, whether the objective
41. See p. 95 infra.
42. 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701 (1939).
43. Seep. 91 infra.
44. 298 Ill. App. 63, 18 N.E.2d 258 (1938); aff'd, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N.E.2d 857
(1939).
45. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
46. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
47. Rowe Transfer and Storage Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 186
Tenn. 265, 209 S.W.2d 35 (1948).
48. Ira A. Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402, 215 S.W.2d 801 (1948).
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was made illegal by a criminal statute,49 or by legislative policy, °
or by public policy as declared by the state's courts.,' Then in Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke52 it was held that a state
could enjoin peaceful picketing of a self-employer upon a judicial
finding that it violated the public policy of the state. The arrival of
the Hanke decision meant that the Lyle case is again good law in
Tennessee, upon its facts, if the court makes appropriate findings of
public policy.
53
If a union strikes or pickets to induce a Tennessee employer to agree
to a union or closed shop, it should be enjoined because the objective
sought would violate the state's Open Shop Law. 4 Although the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court hesitated on this question in 1948,rr a subse-
quent decision of the United States Supreme Court has established
that such an injunction may issue. 6
In Waverly Transfer Co. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers,5 7 an unreported chancery decision, the "unlawful objec-
tive" rule was further applied. The Teamsters union was picketing
the terminal of a nonunion trucker. Employees of connecting truck
lines refused to cross the picket line. An injunction was issued on the
reasoning that the- purpose of the picketing was to prevent the per-
forniance by common carriers and their servants of their common law
duty to the public. This decision and the few in accord with it from
other jurisdictions s raise problems of implications too broad for
discussion here.5 9
49. qiboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
50. Btfilding Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532 (1950).
51. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
52. 339 U.S. 470 (1950)..
'53. 'The limits of the rule that picketing which violates judicially declared
policy may be enjoined are yet to be determined. In a questionable decision,
California recently enjoined peaceful picketing aimed at compelling an em-
ployer to bargain with a supervisors' .union as contrary to its public policy.
$Lfeway Stores, Inc. v.Retail Clerks, 261 P.2d 721 (Cal, 1953).
* 54. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11412.8-11412.11 (Williams Supp. 1952). Prior to
this statute picleting for a closed shop was enjoined by one Tennessee court
s -nducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act. Chattanooga Blow Pipe and Roofing Co. v.
Sheet Metal Workers, 12 CC- LAB. CAS. f 63,706 (Ch. Ct. Shelby Co., April 1,
194 7).
'55. In the case upholding the constitutionality of the Open Shop Law, the
court left the lower court's injunction in effect. On rehearing, the injunction
was modified so as to permit peaceful picketing "as held by the Supreme
Court of the United States," Mascari v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 187
Tenn. 345, 215 S.W.2d 779 (1948)..,-56.- Local No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeyman Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S.
192 (1952).
57. Ch. Ct. Pt. 2, Davidson Co., June 19, 1952. Cited in 3 LAB. L.J. 566
(1952).
58. Accord, Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co.,
23 CCH LAB. CAs. 67,713 (D. Ore. 1953) (damage action); General Drivers
v. American Tobacco Co., 258 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. App. 1953); Truckdrivers V.
Whitfield Transportation, Inc., 259. S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); contra,
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Boycotts-Labor cases arising in Tennessee are remarkably free
of boycott situations. This is probably due to the relative weakness
of the labor movement here as compared with other states and the
resulting scarcity of aggressive unions.60 It is possible that federal
legislation will be held to have preempted the field of regulation of
picketing for boycotts. 1
In an unreported case, Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Communica-
tions Workers,62 the chancellor referred to a prior decree he had issued
in which he enjoined picketing of a gas station by a painters' union.
The union had a dispute with an oil company which leased the prem-
ises to the complainant and furnished him with gas and oil products.
The chancellor issued injunctions in both cases because of the lack
of any dispute between the picketed employer and the union. The
gas station case involves "product picketing" which is non-enjoinable
under the New York "unity of interest" doctrine63 if the pickets'
signs are properly labeled.
Mass picketing and violence-Rowe Transfer and Storage Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters6 4 involved an employer who
had refused to recognize the defendant union as bargaining agent
for his employees. It picketed his premises, seeking recognition and
also to induce his employees to join the union. Upon the employer's
affidavit of mass picketing and threats of violence the chancellor
issued a blanket preliminary injunction of all picketing. After a hear-
ing and jury findings of threatened violence, the decree was made
final. The court of appeals modified the injunction so as to permit
peaceful picketing and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court fol-
lowed the principles of Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies,65 and held that it was error to issue a blanket injunction
unless the threats of violence were so enmeshed with the picketing
that it was "tinged with violence." Acts of violence disassociated in
time and place from the picketing could not justify such an injunction.
The opinion of the court of appeals in this case66 contains a valu-
S. E. Overton Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 115 F. Supp. 764 (W.D.
Mich. 1953).
59. The Montgomery Ward decision, supra note 58, has an excellent dis-
cussion of the position of a carrier in labor disputes. See Petro and Koretz,
Labor Relations Law (1953 Ann. Surv. Am. Law) 29 -N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 375-
78 (1954).
60. It may be due in part to a fear of the Tennessee statute awarding treble
damages in an action for inducing breach of contract. Witness the fate of the
electrical workers in Haven v. Howard, infra note 115.
61. See p. 77 supra.
62. 21 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 66,961 (Ch. Ct. Pt. 2, Shelby Co. No. 54172 R.D.,
Apr. 10, 1952).
63. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
64. 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W.2d 35 (1948).
65. 312 U.S. 287 (1940).
66. Rowe Transfer and Storage Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 13
CCH LAB. CAs. 1 64,160 (Tenn. App. E. S. Nov. 24, 1947). A prior opinion of
the supreme court denying certiorari and supersedeas upon the preliminary
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able discussion of sound equity practice in such matters. It considered
the propriety of the blanket preliminary injunction issued by the
chancellor, a question not reviewed by the supreme court. The gravity
of this relief was emphasized along with the particularity' which
should be required of affidavits, and it was held to be error to issue
such a decree where the affidavits were without detail as to whether
the threats were so closely connected with the picketing as to warrant
a blanket injunction. However an interlocutory injunction against
violence and continued threats is permissible upon proper allegations
since "no great harm can result even though the charge turns out to
be untrue or exaggerated." A decree limiting the number of pickets
would also be proper at this stage. Then, if the facts as shown upon
a hearing warrant, the injunction against intimidation and violence
may be made permanent and all picketing enjoined.
But exactly what findings of fact are sufficient to meet the objec-
tion that an injunction of peaceful picketing is a denial of labor's
right to communicate the facts of a dispute? The Rowe case contains
dicta that a blanket injunction is proper where "it is necessary to
prevent future acts of intimidation which in the light of past conduct
may reasonably be anticipated.167 This is an understatement of the
Meadowmoor doctrine. Reasonable anticipation of future acts of in-
timidation is not sufficient. The lower court in the Meadowmoor case
had found in effect that "peaceful" picketing was impossible. The
past picketing was set in such a "background of violence" that "it
could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated
by past violence would survive even though future picketing might
be wholly peaceful."68 In other words, the picketing must be so
interwoven with violence that in the future the simple act of picket-
ing would itself be coercive. In light of this strict limitation it is
doubtful if the United States Supreme Court would hold that mere
unexecuted threats of violence, such as the proof in the Rowe case
showed, could ever justify an injunction of all peaceful picketing.
As yet no Tennessee decision has denied the right to continue to
picket peacefully because of attendant violence in the past. The pro-
cedure in the Rowe case of enjoining excesses and allowing peaceful
picketing was followed in at least four other cases, some of which
limited the number of pickets by their decrees. 9
injunction in this case appears at 11 CCH LAB. CAS. 63,293 (July 23, 1946).
67. Rowe Transfer and Storage Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 186
Tenn. 265, 271, 209 S.W.2d 35, 37 (1948).
68. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 294
(1940).
69. Lodge Mfg. C o. v. Gilbert, 195 Tenn. 403, 260 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. 1953)
(one picket); United Steel Workers v. Nashville Corp., 187 Tenn. 444, 215
S.W.2d 818 (1948); Ira A. Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402, 215 S.W.2d
801 (1948); American Snuff Co. v. United Steel Workers, 19 CCH LAB. CAS.
66,127 (Tenn. App. W.S., Jan. 11, 1951).
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Fraudulent picketing-In no reported case has the issue of per-
missible language in picketing signs been dealt with directly. In Ira
A. Watson Co. v. Wilson70 the union had failed to win a single em-
ployee in its attempt to unionize the complainant's store. It then
picketed the store as "unfair." The chancellor prohibited the use of
the word "unfair" and limited the union to informing the public that
it was a "nonunion store" because "it ought to be more definite and
ought to speak the truth and not a conclusion."
7 1 The supreme court
left the decree undisturbed.7
2
CRnImNAL LIABILITY OF UNIONS AND THEm MEMBERS
Criminal contempt-The only case in which the Tennessee Supreme
Court has considered convictions for criminal contempt for violation
of a labor injunction is United Steel Workers v. Nashville Corpora-
tion.73 There the chancellor had permitted peaceful picketing but
enjoined violence and intimidation, limited the number of pickets
and restricted the area of picketing. On appeal, the defendants who
were convicted of violating the injunction contended that it violated
their constitutional rights and challenged the sufficiency of the proof
to sustain their convictions.
The court indicated approval of the injunctive decree, but held
that even if it were erroneous or irregular it must be obeyed. This
is the general rule so long as the court has jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter 74 because the essence of criminal contempt
is an offense against the dignity of the court. If a court issues a pre-
liminary injunction in a case where its jurisdiction is challenged, the
question of John L. Lewis' famous contempt case is presented. It was
held there by the United States Supreme Court that a court may
preserve the subject matter of a suit by preliminary injunction while
it determines the question of its own power and that violations of its
order are punishable regardless of final disposition of the jurisdictional
issue.75 This rule could become one of increasing importance while
70. 187 Tenn. 402, 215 S.W.2d 801 (1948).
71. This is shown in the opinion of Prewitt, J. denying rehearing. It is
reprinted at 15 CCH LAB. CAs. 64,575. In Cafeteria Employees v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943), New York had enjoined picketing of a restaurant
where the union had no members and in which all the employees were part-
ners, relying in part on the basis that the statements of the placards were
false. The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter in
which he stated, "And to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part
of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies
-like 'unfair' or 'fascist'--is not to falsify facts."
72. An employer may possibly have a libel action against a union which
publicizes him as "unfair." Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Wise, 247 S.W.2d
989 (Ky. 1952), cert. denied 343 U.S. 942 (1952).
73. 187 Tenn. 444, 215 S.W.2d 818 (1948).
74. Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922). In re Vanvaver, 88 Tenn. 334, 12
S.W. 786 (1890).
75. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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the jurisdiction of state courts in labor disputes is in a state of un-
certainty under the hazy doctrine of federal preemption. 70
In the Nashville Corporation case the Tennessee Supreme Court ap-
plied its general rule for criminal appeals, that a convicted defendant
is presumed guilty on appeal and to upset the conviction he must show
that the proof preponderates against the findings. 7 A subsequent
unreported case in the court of appeals, American Snuff Co. v. United
-Steel Workers,7 8 involved similar facts and demonstrated the difficulty
of discharging this burden. There several defendants had been con-
victed of contempt for violating an injunction by assaulting non-
striking employees. Apparently the only evidence in some instances
was the contradictory testimony of the defendant and the victim of
the assault. The appellate court followed the Nashville Corporation
case and viewed the assignments as questions of fact under which the
chancellor had refused to believe the defendants' testimony. All con-
victions were upheld.
In both the Nashville Corporation and the American Snuff cases,
the question arose as to the proof of notice of the injunction as to
defendants who were not personally served but who were charged
with contempt of the decree or abetting in a contempt. The cases
leave the question in some doubt. In the first case notice was not
denied but the supreme court discussed the matter at length. Two
defendants had indicated by their testimony that they had knowledge
of the injunction and a third, who did not testify, had been charged
twice before with violations of the injunction. The fourth did not
take the stand; but he was a member of the union enjoined; the in-
junction had been discussed at union meetings; and he was among
strikers who congregated around the plant. The injunction had been
posted and publicized in the press and apparently all his associates
had knowledge of it. The court reasonably concluded:
"In other words a court must assume under these proven facts that
Stephens had the required knowledge and notice of this injunction in
the absence of his denials thereof. We would stultify ourselves if we
concluded otherwise." 79
In the American Snuff case the proof was not so strong and the
court of appeals was faced with denials of knowledge of the injunc-
tion by three defendants. The three were not members of the union
76. For an interesting federal case which arose in Tennessee and involved
this issue, see American Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 689 (6th
Cir. 1954).
77. State v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974 (1916).
78. 19 CCH LAB. CAS. % 66,127 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).




involved but were charged with an assault in conjunction with a
union striker who admitted knowledge of the decree. The only other
circumstances cited by the Court were that two of the defendants
were members of an affiliated CIO union at another plant, and the
third defendant was a brother-in-law of one, and a neighbor of the
other, of the first two. All three had congregated with pickets around
the struck plant and could have seen large notices of the injunction
posted there. These circumstances may not appear sufficient to a
legalistic observer but the matter is one highly difficult of proof. The
court in effect placed the burden on the appellants to show lack of
knowledge of the injunction, thus including this element within the
general rule of presumption of guilt on appeal.
In the American Snuff case questions arose as to the application
of the terms of the decree. Five defendants were charged with violat-
ing the portion of the decree limiting the number of pickets. They
denied that they were "pickets" although the proof showed that they
were in a sympathetic crowd which congregated around those carrying
signs and which obstructed access to the plant. The court viewed them
as at least aiding and abetting in a violation and stated:
"In view of the admitted sympathetic attitude of all the appellants for
the cause, their availability to assist in the acts of obstruction, their
close proximity to those actually effecting the obstruction, and their
obvious approval of the act, it matters not which ones wore the signs,
or physically stood in or walked in and across the driveway, or
whether they were employees of complainant."80
Four other defendants were charged with assaulting a photographer
hired by the employer to take pictures of the strikers. The assault
occurred in the parking lot across the street from the plant. This
was held to be within the part of the decree enjoining any denial of
ingress or egress to a person having the right of access to the em-
ployer's place of business. Also, even though the photographer might
be an independent contractor, the assault was held to violate the
spirit of that part of the injunction prohibiting the intimidation of
complainant's "employees.' 1
The convictions of all the defendants were unheld and sentences of
light fines and jail sentences sustained. Apparently the union as such
80. American Snuff Co. v. United Steel Workers, 19 CCH LAB. CAs. % 66,127,
p. 78,759 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
81. Citing Blair v. Nelson, 67 Tenn. 1 (1874), for the proposition that vio-
lating "the spirit of the injunction" is a contempt. In Jones v. State, 170 Ark.
863, 865, 281 S.W. 663, 664 (1924), unionists had been enjoined from "congre-
gating in large or small numbers at, or near, the place of business of the plain-
tiffs ... for the purpose of intimidating through force of numbers, any officer,
agent or employee of plaintiffs. . . ." The defendant led a procession of about
two hundred miners' wives upon the property of plaintiff. 'On appeal from a
conviction of criminal contempt this was viewed as a "technical violation"
and the sentence of a heavy fine and jail sentence was *reduced to a $50 fine.
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was not cited for contempt in either of the above cases. It would seem
that since unions as entities are proper parties defendant in Tennes-
see,82 a court may punish any official union acts which violate its
decree by fines assessed against union property. Such fines may be
used for punitive purposes and also may be designed to secure future
compliance with the Court's decree. In United States v. United Mine
Workers8 3 the union had been fined $3,500,000 for contempt. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court this was modified to require a
payment of $700,000, with payment of the additional $2,800,000 con-
ditioned on future compliance with the injunction.
Criminal Conspiracy-The early common law view that combina-
tions of workers were illegal conspiracies8 4 had probably disappeared
from American cases before trade unions developed in Tennessee. In
possibly the first case which could have raised the question it was
declared:
"A labor union organized for the purpose of regulating the wages of
its members and the promotion of their interests as laboring people
is lawful."s 5
Two cases have removed all doubts as to whether Tennessee's
special anti-conspiracy statute 6 can be applied to conspiracies among
union members to commit unlawful acts in furtherance of a union
objective. The scope of the statute had been considerably clarified
in 1929 by Chief Justice Green's opinion in Trotter and Arnold v.
States 7 which held that it did not apply to a conspiracy to appropriate
public funds by a school official and a building contractor. The opinion
noted that the act had been aimed at "white cap" or "night rider"
groups which were terrorizing communities by the acts listed in the
statute and whose existence was a public scandal at the time of its
passage in 1899. It was conceded that literally the statute might apply
to the conduct in issue but such would not effect the true intent or
spirit of the act which was intended to combat an organization, com-
bination or conspiracy "with an existence more or less protracted."
In Asbury v. State8 three members of the United Mine Workers
had been convicted under this statute for the beating of a nonunion
foreman. In a brief opinion it was held that the statute applied to
organizations "created" for the purposes set forth in the statute.
Since it was conceded that the union was created for lawful purposes
82. See p. 90 infra.
83. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
84. See Neiles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COL. L. REv. 1128 (1932); White,
Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. (1926).
85. Powers v. Journeyman Bricklayers, 130 Tenn. 643, 646, 172 S.W. 284, 285
(1914).
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11608 (Williams 1934).
87. 158 Tenn. 264, 12 S.W.2d 951 (1929).
88. 178 Tenn. 43, 154 S.W.2d 794 (1941).
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the indictment on this count was defective and the conviction was
reversed.
The Asbury case established that the mere fact that individual
union members conspire to commit a single criminal act to accomplish
an objective of the group does not bring them within the statute. But
what of the case where a conspiracy to commit a series of such acts
is official union policy for'the accomplishment of some union objective
such as winning a strike?
This question was answered in State v. Cox. 9 Thirteen defendants,
including the local president and two national representatives, all
members of the Steel Workers Union, were indicted under Section
11608. The indictment followed the language of the statute and
charged a conspiracy to further a strike and impede plant operations
by inflicting corporal punishment on employees and destroying the
property of both employer and employees, the conspiracy to continue
until the employer yielded. The indictment was quashed and the
supreme court affirmed. The statute contemplates a "society or asso-
ciation which has as its purpose a violation of law ... an organized
body to effect some general policy continuing in its nature or perma-
nent in its purposes."90 Since the confederacy charged in the indict-
ment was to exist only until the strike was won, the statute did not
apply.
The result of these cases is that the "white cap" statute cannot apply
to the typical labor organization. Only a union which is created and
operated under a scheme of violence and unlawfulness to accomplish
its purposes indefinitely could come within its narrow prohibition.
Cm i LIABmiLTY OF UNIoNs AN THEm MEMBERS
Jurisdiction and Process in Suits Against Unions.-Generally, at
common law, labor unions, like other voluntary associations, were not
regarded as legal entities and could not be sued as such.91 However,
some courts, including Tennessee,92 allowed such associations to be
sued in equity in a class or representative action where the individual
defendants were numerous and a common interest prevailed between
them. The leading judge-made departure from the common-law rule
in actions at law was United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,93
in which the United States Supreme Court held that a labor union
had a separate entity apart from its members and could be sued in
89. 16 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 65,022 (1949).
90. Id. at p. 75,260. Chief Justice Neil concurred specially indicating that
the statute might apply to subversive groups within a union who used union
activity as a guise while seeking to overthrow the government by violence.
91. 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1362 (1940). For
a survey of statutory and case law on the subject See Sellers, Suability of
Trade Unions as a Legal Entity, 33 CAL. L. REV. 444 (1945).
92. Powers v. Journeyman Bricklayers, 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S.W. 284 (1914).
93. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
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its common name by service of process upon its principal officers.
The entity theory of union suability is now the law of Tennessee by
virtue of a 1947 statute94 which requires both resident and non-resident
associations to appoint agents for service of process before doing
business in the state. If the association fails to do so, all process may
be served on the Secretary of State who is required to forward a copy
to the association's last known address. The act further provides that
such service is to be binding upon the association and that
"any judgment recovered in any action commenced by service of
process, as provided in this act, shall be valid and may be collected
out of any real or personal property belonging to the association or
organization."95
In McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America0 the constitu-
tionality of this statute was sustained over objections of a non-resident
national labor organization. The court observed that it applied only to
suits arising out of business conducted within the state which in
this instance was picketing in the course of a strike. The plaintiff
had been shot while crossing a picket line. He joined as defendants
two individual union men who fired shots, the local, and also the
national organization. The court upheld a judgment for the plaintiff
against the individuals and the local and reversed a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction as to the national. The court expressly held that the
statute authorized suits against labor organizations as such, noting
that it also provided for service of process and judgment.
9 7
For purposes of suits in federal courts for breach of collective
agreements under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act unions are
treated as legal entities.9 8 This is true regardless of state law on the
subject since the act creates .a federal substantive right.0 9 In civil
suits other than those enforcing a federal right, Rule 17 (b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the capacity of an
unincorporated association to be sued is determined by the law of
the state in which the district court is held.
Liability of unions.-The common law went through an intensive
struggle in its attempts to apply traditional standards in determining
the lawfulness of collective employee action. 0 0 The two tests most
94. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8681.1-8681.3 (Williams Supp. 1952).
95. Id. § 8681.3.
96. 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (E.S. 1952). See Sanders, Labor Law-
1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAmN. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1953).
97. See also American Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 689 (6th
Cir. 1954).
98. Section 301 (b). 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (b) (Supp.
1953).
99. Shirley-Herman Co. v. Int'l Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950);
but see Patterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Paper Makers
191 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1951).
100. See Sir%=, CASES AND MATERIALS oN LABOR LAW 12 (1953) for a sum-
mary for the various common law theories used.
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frequently employed have been the "ends-means" test, which con-
demns concerted action if either the objective or methods are im-
proper,' 0 ' and the "prima facie tort" or "just cause" test which makes
actionable the intentional infliction of economic injury upon another
unless it is justified by serving some legitimate interest of the actor.10 2
The prima-facie tort theory was rejected by the Tennessee court
in 1884 in Payne v. Western and Atlantic R.R.10 3 The railroad had
threatened to discharge all employees who traded in the plaintiff's
store. He alleged that its action was a malicious attempt to destroy
his business. A majority of the court conceded that the plaintiff's
interest in his business was a protectable property right and that if
the defendants had driven away his customers by intimidation or
violence he would have an action irrespective of their motive because
of the illegal means employed. But they held that the malicious
exercise of the employer's right to discharge employees at will could
not give rise to any action despite resultant injury to plaintiff's
business. Judge Freeman dissented vigorously in a scholarly state-
ment of the prima-facie tort theory. He reasoned from the proposition
that a man must use his own property so as not to injure others. The
legal right to discharge employees was used here, not to secure any
advantage to the defendant, but solely to injure the plaintiff in his
business. This should be actionable unless the defendant could show
some justification such as that the trader debauched the employees,
or sold unsound food, or in some way affected the employees' useful-
ness to him. He concluded:
This is not in any way to interfere with the legal right to discharge
an employee for good cause, or without any reason assigned if the
contract justifies it, but only that he shall not do this solely for the
purpose of injury to another, or hold the threat over the employee
in terrorrem to fetter the freedom of the employee, and for the purpose
of injuring an obnoxious party. 0 4
Judge Freeman's view became the law of Tennessee in 1915 when
Hutton v. Waters'0 5 expressly overruled the Payne case and followed
his dissent. The plaintiff, who operated a boarding house, sued the
president of a private school for maliciously attempting to destroy
her business by threats against students who boarded with her. She
alleged that the defendant acted not to secure any business or com-
101. This is asserted as the basic standard of liability in RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 775 (1935).
102. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d
401 (1946).
103. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
104. Id. at 542.
105. 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See also Gregory v. Dealers' Equip-
ment Co., 156 Tenn. 273, 300 S.W. 563 (1927); McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455,
181 S.W. 930 (1916).
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petitive advantage but solely out of ill will because of her refusal to
discharge a boarder whom the defendant disliked. It was held that
she stated a cause of action.
There has been little occasion for the application of the prima-facie
tort theory to collective employee interference with the right to
conduct a business. In essence the court applied it in the Lyle case, 00
where picketing to compel a sole proprietor to join a union was en-
joined. Picketing was not considered to be a justifiable advancement
of legitimate self-interest when directed at one with whom the pickets
had no contractual relation. Some courts have regarded picketing for
a unionized shop as justifiable concerted action because of a union's
interest in eliminating nonunion competition and protecting union
standards.10 7 The Lyle case could be considered today under the
"ends-means" reasoning since its objective could be held to violate
the public policy of the state.103
What of the case where an employee alleges that the union has
unjustifiably interfered with his employment by causing his dis-
charge? Dukes v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper-
hangers' 9 held that an existing employment is a property right which
is protected from malicious interference. The defendant union was
charged in an action for damages with causing the plaintiff's dis-
charge by false and malicious statements to his employer that he had
been expelled from the union. The union had indicated to the em-
ployer that he would be unable to hire union labor unless the plaintiff
was fired. The allegation of fraud should have been sufficient to sup-
port a cause of action because of the unlawful means employed, but
the court chose to rely on the allegation that the union had acted
maliciously. Apparently the plaintiff had lost out in some internal
union politics and the victors were seeking to punish him. Although
the union may have had a right to withhold its labor from the em-
ployer for a legitimate purpose, it could not do so solely to injure the
plaintiff.
Griffith v. Stove Mounters International Union,"0 an unreported
case, presented a similar situation. The action was based upon an
alleged conspiracy between the union and the employer to discharge
the plaintiff because of his activities on the union's grievance com-
mittee. The action was dismissed as to the employer, but the union's
demurrer was overruled because it could have been guilty of wrong-
fully causing the discharge.
106. Lyle v. Local No. 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 174 Tenn. 222, 124
S.W.2d 701 (1939), discussed supra at p. 81.
107. C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d
414 (1940).
108. See supra p. 82.
109. 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W.2d 7, 21 TENN. L. REV. 884 (1950).
110. 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 65,537 (Cir. Ct. Hamilton Co., Nov. 28, 1949).
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A union is of course liable to injured parties if it commits an act
which is unlawful in itself. It is held for breaches of its contracts to
the same extent as are other associations and it is liable for torts insti-
gated to further its objectives. One of the earliest civil actions against
a union in Tennessee" involved a fraud perpetrated upon an em-
ployer. The Journeyman Bricklayers' Union had a monopoly of its
craft in Knoxville and set wage scales by which all bricklayers agreed
to abide. It followed its usual practice of announcing its schedule of
wages for the coming year and notified Powers, a contractor, that it
was to be 62% cents per hour. The scale was later reduced but Powers,
was not notified and he continued to pay the higher scale. He sued
the union for damages in the amount of the excessive wages he had
paid and the supreme court ruled in his favor. The announcement of
the wage scale was treated as a continuing representation that it was
the agreed basis of contract for bricklayers. It became a continuing
misrepresentation when the scale was changed. The court empha-
sized the union's monopoly power and in effect imposed upon it a duty
to exercise that power fairly by giving notice of changes in its uni-
laterally fixed rates. The case is somewhat unique" 2 but the result is
a fair one and upon its facts it should still be good law.
A successful union boycott is apt to result in the breach of existing
contracts. The Tennessee statute providing for treble damages in an
action for inducing breach of contract" 3 has apparently never been
applied in a reported case." 4 But its potential is suggested by a recent
unreported decision in a trial court." 5 In an extremely brief statement
of the case, it appears only that the jury found that an electrical
workers union had unlawfully "procured a breach of City Electric
Services' contract with L. A. Warlic Co." and found damages of
$7,330. The chancellor concurred in these findings, trebled the dam-
ages, and awarded a judgment for $21,990.
Fixing Union Responsibiity. The mere fact that torts are com-
mitted by union members in the conduct of union activity is not
sufficient to establish union liability. While the ordinary rules of
111. Powers v. Journeyman Bricklayers Union, 130 Tenn. 643, 172 S.W. 284
(1914).
112. The Note at L.R.A. 1915E 1006 regards it as a case of first impression.
113. "It shall be unlawful for any person, by inducement, persuasion, mis-
representation, or other means, to induce or procure the breach or violation,
refusal or failure to perform any lawful contract by any party thereto; and
in every case where a breach or violation of such contract is so procured, the
person so procuring or inducing the same shall be liable in treble the amount
of damages resulting from or incident to the breach of said contract; and the
party injured by such breach may bring his suit for said breach and for such
damages." TENN. CODE ANN. § 7811 (Williams 1934).
114. See 21 TENN. L. REV. 856 (1951). The statute was held inapplicable in
Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925) (contract violated statute
of frauds); Johnson v. Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S.W. 531 (1922) (good faith
of defendant); Lichter v. Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1938)
(inducement of refusal to contract).
115. 32 LRRM 2673 (No. 3785 Ch. Ct. Bradley Co., Aug. 13, 1953).
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agency apply to such situations, torts are 'usually committed in a
confused factual setting of strikes and picketing, and proof of union
responsibility may be difficult.
The only Tennessee case which has dealt directly with the point in
an action for damages is McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of
America"6 which involved union responsibility for gunshots fired
from a picket line. It illustrates the sort of circumstantial evidence
which of necessity must be used. The evidence showed that union
members were in the picket line just prior to the shooting and had
no opportunity to leave. Forty-seven shots were fired and it was
shown that the individual defendants, both union members, fired
shots. Officers of the local were seen frequently in the picket line and
the business agent was heard to tell two men to "thin out" the
workers as they came- out the gate. A judgment against the local
union was affirmed.
Enforcement of Judgments.-The statute dealing with service on
unincorporated associations provides that service pursuant to it will
bind the association to any-judgment recovered thereunder and that
the judgment may be recovered out of any real or personal property
belonging to the association.117 Tort actions will usually find members
or officers of the union joined as defendants. They are of course then
personally liable for any judgment rendered if the action is sustained
as to them.
Exemption of Union Property from Taxation. Local unions in Nash-
ville formed a corporation to hold title to a building which was used
for union meetings and for free vocational instruction for members
and the general public. Nashville Labor Temple v. City of Nashville"8
held the building to be exempt from taxation as property held for
educational purposes. Apparently no other state has held in accord-
ance with this case 1 9 and the scope of the exemption has since been
considerably narrowed. 20 If the holding were followed to its logical
extreme it could result in exemption of such property from tort
liability also.
121
116. 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (E.S. 1952).
117. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8681.2-8681.3 (Williams Supp. 1952). The Taft-
Hartley Act has a similar provision for actions brought under Section 301.
118. 146 Tenn. 429, 243 S.W. 78 (1922).
119. The annotator at 23 A.L.R. 813 (1923) found it to be the first case in
which union property had been claimed to be tax exempt. The case was dis-
tinguished by the Florida Supreme Court on similar facts. It held that a
union's educational activities were only incidental to its main purpose of im-
proving the status of its members. Johnson v. Sparkman, 159 Fla. 276, 31
So.2d 863 (1947); accord, County Assessor v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners, 202 Okla. 162, 211 P.2d 790 (1949); cf. Lane v. Wilson, 103 Colo.
99, 83 P.2d 328 (1938).
120. See e.g., Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140
S.W.2d 1088 (1940); State v. Waggoner, 162 Tenn. 172, 35 S.W.2d 389 (1931);
Knoxville v. Fort Sanders Hospital, 148 Tenn. 699, 257 S.W. 408 (1924).




THE TENNEssEE ENTICEIVIENT STATUTE
Sections 8559 and 8560 of the Tennessee Code' 22 are as follows:
§ 8559. It shall be unlawful for any person, knowingly, to hire, contract
with, decoy or entice away, directly or indirectly, any one, who is at the
time under contract or in the employ of another; and any person so
under contract or employ of another, leaving his employ without good
and sufficient cause, before the expiration of the time for which he was
employed, shall forfeit to the employer all sums due for service already
rendered, and be liable for such other damages the employer may reason-
ably sustain by such violation of contract. (1875, ch. 93, sec. 1.)
§ 8560. Any person violating the provisions of the first clause of the
preceding section shall be liable to the party who originally was entitled
to the services of said employee, by virtue of a previous contract, for
such damages as he may reasonably sustain by the loss of the labor of
said employee; and, whether he had knowledge of an existing contract
or not, if he fails or refuses to discharge the person so hired, or to pay
such damages as the original employer may reasonably claim, after he
has been notified that the person is under contract, or has violated the
contract with such other person, which amount shall be ascertained, and
the collection enforced by action for damages before any court or justice
of the peace of the county where said violation occurs, or the party
violating said section may reside. (Id., sec. 2, modified.)
Several things should be noted. Section 8559, by using the terms
"undet contract or in the employ of another," could be construed
as protecting from willful interference both employments at will
and contracts of employment for a term. But Section 8560 then gives
an action only to one who was entitled "by virtue of a previous con-
tract" to the services of the person enticed away. The second part of
8560 which requires the innocent "enticer" to either discharge the
employee or to respond in damages uses the language "whether he
had knowledge of an existing contract or not." The second clause
of 8559 makes the employee liable only if he left his employment
without cause "before the expiration of the time for which he was
employed." Thus it appears from a reading of the statute as a whole
that it was intended to apply only to employment contracts for a
term and not to employments at will.123 The language of the first
clause "under contract or in the employ" is probably intended to
include a person who has made a contract for a future term of
employment but has not yet entered into the employer's service. A
federal court which applied the statute in 1901 in a labor injunction
case 2 4 held expressly that it did not include employments at will, but
122. TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams 1934).
123. The state supreme court has held that the two sections must be con-
strued as a whole. See note 139 infra.
124. Southern Ry. v. Machinists Local Union No. 14, 111 Fed. 49 (C.C.
W.D. Tenn. 1901). In Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Grogan, 189 Ala. 64, 66 So. 597
(1915), Alabama applied its statute to ordinary employees but its terms differ
materially from the Tennessee act.
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Tennessee decisions have not been so explicit.
This statute, enacted in 1875, is in many respects an anachronism.
Enticement statutes are peculiar to the southern states, some ten of
them having adopted similar acts during the Reconstruction period.12 5
Although basically similar, statutes varied in some respects. For in-
stance, North Carolina and Georgia first protected only written
contracts but their statutes were later amended to include oral
agreements.126  Some expressly provided both civil and criminal
sanctions 127 and Louisiana provided for criminal penalty only.128 The
Mississippi and North Carolina statutes have been held inapplicable
if the servant has not yet entered the master's service even though
he may have contracted to do so,129 a result which should not obtain
in Tennessee if the author's foregoing analysis of its statute is correct.
Some statutes expressly applied only to farm tenancies and share-
cropper agreements. 30
The enticement statutes were designed to meet certain difficulties
which beset the South's agrarian economy during the Reconstruction
era. Several have been since repealed' 3' and they are rarely applied
today. 32 Some states' decisions frankly admit that their statutes
were precipitated by the instability of agricultural labor resulting
from the abolition of slavery. The Supreme Court of Georgia in up-
holding that state's enticement statute observed:
And the Legislature of 1866, looking to the derangement of an entire
system of labor, and warranted by the facts growing out of the circum-
stances in which the colored element was wholly irresponsible for
any breach of contract, and consequently regardless of it, and the
failure of all law to enforce such contracts, or provide any remedy or
redress for such wrongs and appreciating the great public necessity
of punishing employers whose acts contributed to the violation of such
contracts, enacted this salutary law, which we hold first, it was within
their constitutional power to do .... 133
125. ALA. CODE tit. 26, §§ 330-333 (1940); ARK. STAT. §§ 81-210 (1947); FLA.
GEN. LAWS, §§ 7166, 7167 (1927) (repealed in 1943; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
448.02); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9902-9905 (1952); Ky. REv. STAT. § 310 (1948); LA.
CRIM. STAT. § 57 (Marr. 1929) (no longer in effect); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2129
(1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-347, 14-348 (1953); S.C. CODE § 454 (1952).
126. See Hudgens v. State, 126 Ga. 639, 55 S.E. 492 (1906); Hightower v.
State, 72 Ga. 482 (1884); State v. Rice, 76 N.C. 194 (1877).
127. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina.
128. See Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902).
129. Hendricks v. State, 79 Miss. 368, 36 So. 708 (1901); Sears v. Whitaker,
136 N.C. 37, 48 S.E. 517 (1904).
130. North Carolina.
131. Florida, Louisiana.
132. The cases digested in the National Reporter System indicate that only
the Mississippi statute has been applied to any substantial degree in the last
twenty years.
133. Bryan v. State, 44 Ga. 328, 333 (1871).
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The Mississippi Supreme Court found a similar background for its
statute:
The section of the Code was designed to stabilize the agricultural in-
dustry, the chief industry of the state, and to this end the Legislature
penalized all efforts of one farmer to persuade the tenants of another
farmer to "jump their contracts." The agricultural labor of this state
is overwhelmingly of African descent. They are credulous and fickle,
and are easily persuaded, and thus for the common good this statute
was enacted. 3 4
The text and historical background of the Tennessee statute indi-
cate then that it was intended to apply only to contracts of employ-
ment for a term and then only to stabilize agricultural employment
by preventing farmers from bidding for each other's labor. But the
few cases decided under it have not been so limited.
In 1883 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered two cases under
the statute. It held in McCutchin v. Taylor135 that the statute applied
to a sharecropping agreement. In Morris v. Neville, 8 agricultural
laborers were again involved. The owner of the plantation to which
the laborers moved after having put out crops on the plaintiff's farm
defended that the employees had voluntarily broken their contracts
before he dealt with them. He requested a charge that he was not
liable if they had left the plaintiff's employ either "with or without
cause." The court affirmed the denial of this request noting that
under Section 8560 the defendant was liable even though he hired
the persons without knowledge of a prior contract, if upon receiving
notice he failed to discharge them.
The opinion in the Morris case does not indicate the terms of the
charge given in the court below but it implies that the subsequent
employer might be liable even if the prior contract was breached with
good cause. This question was answered in the negative in the third
and last case in which the supreme court considered the enticement
statute. In Jordan v. Lewis 37 it was held that where a tenant farmer
left his first landlord with cause this defense was available in an ac-
tion against his subsequent employer. Although the statute literally
makes breach for cause a defense only for the employee as against
his first employer, the court held that 8559 and 8560 must be read
together. If the laborer is justified in quitting his employment, a
third person commits no wrong in hiring him. Any other holding
134. Evans v. State, 121 Miss. 252, 83 So. 167, 168 (1919).
135. 79 Tenn. 259 (1883).
136. 79 Tenn. 271 (1883). Contra, Johns v. Patterson, 138 Ark. 420, 211 S.W.
387 (1919); Evans v. State, 121 Miss. 752, 83 So. 167 (1919); Minton v. Early,
183 N.C. 199, 111 S.E. 347 (1922). These cases reason that a denial of the
right to employ one who has voluntarily abandoned his prior employment
would be unconstitutional.
137. 162 Tenn. 953, 39 S.W.2d 743 (1931).
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would have nullified a wronged employee's right to leave and seek
a livelihood elsewhere.
The enticement statute was invoked more recently in the Western
Section of the Court of Appeals in 1947 in Stewart v. Price.138 Price
had won a judgment in the lower court. On appeal Stewart's theory
was that the evidence showed that he did not hire the plaintiff's
tenant until two days after the tenant had repudiated his agreement
to make a crop for the plaintiff. The court conceded this arguendo
but upheld the judgment because the jury could have found that
Stewart had induced the employee to breach his contract by certain
statements made to him before the contract was repudiated. This
suggests that the "enticing away" and a subsequent hiring are each
separate and distinct violations of the statute both of which would
be actionable, a question which will be discussed shortly.
The unsuccessful defendant was again before the court of appeals
in Stewart v. Parker.13 9 In Price's action against him the proof of
damages had included an advancement of $339.81 which Price had
loaned the tenant on the strength of the crop to be made. The debt
was subsequently paid and Stewart sought to enjoin the execution
of Price's $500 judgment to this extent. The court held that Stewart's
complaint was properly dismissed because he had been adjudged
guilty of violating the state's public policy as declared in the entice-
ment statute and came into equity with unclean hands.140
The foregoing decisions raise no serious questions as to the proper
scope of the enticement statute. All involved breaches of agricultural
contracts of employment for a term and all involved suits against
defendants who employed the contract breakers with knowledge or
subsequent notice of the contracts. Although the wisdom of the
statute may be questioned in present-day Tennessee, these decisions
are in harmony with its original purpose. But two other decisions
raise troublesome questions. In one a labor union was the defendant
and in the other the employee was "enticed" to join a partnership.
A strike of railway employees led to the decision in Southern Ry.
v. Machinists Local Union No. 14.141 Federal Judge Hammond issued
a sweeping, detailed injunction in which he prohibited all picketing
to induce the railroad's ordinary employees to join the strike and
persuasion of any sort to induce apprentices to quit their jobs. The
latter's contracts of employment were held to be within the entice-
138. 12 CCH LAB. CAs. f 63,819 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1947).
139. 33 Tenn. App. 316, 232 S.W.2d 57 (W.S. 1950).
140. The chancellor did not rely on this. A more sound basis for the de-
cision would seem to be that the court could not determine if, and to what
extent, the jurors in reaching their verdict had assumed that the tenant
would fail to discharge his debt. The appeal assigned as error the exclusion
of statements of three jurors.
141. 111 Fed. 49 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1901).
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ment statute's protection since they were contracts for a term, but
it was held to be inapplicable to employees at will. To the argument
that the statute should not apply to labor unions, the court answered:
It may be conceded that it is not at all likely that a Tennessee legis-
lature intended to make by this statute a law against strikes and
strikers and the labor unions.... But this consideration cannot control
the courts in the construction of the statute, if it be broad enough in
the language used to cover the case of strikes and the labor unions.142
In Crim Motor Co. v. Shackleton 43 the plaintiff was a garage oper-
ator. The defendant had persuaded a mechanic to leave plaintiff's
service in order that the two might form a partnership and run a
garage in a nearby town. The court of appeals reversed a verdict
directed for the defendant. The lower court had held that the statute
applied only to a defendant who employed the person under contract
and not to one who entered a partnership with him because only a
subsequent employer could "discharge" the employee as directed in
8560 upon notice of a prior contract. The decision concedes arguendo
that where a partnership is formed without the third party's knowl-
edge of the prior contract there might be no liability because of the
inability of one partner to discharge another. But the court viewed
a violation of 8559 as complete when the defendant had "enticed
away" the mechanic with knowledge of the prior employment irre-
spective of the nature of their subsequent relationship. It does not
appear if the prior employment of the mechanic was at will or for
a term.
It is submitted that the lower court employed the better reason-
ing. Its interpretation of the statute would not only avoid the harsh
result of this case but insure that it is not again applied to union ac-
tivities as it was in the Southern Ry. case. The reasoning of the Crim
Motor Co. case that the wilful enticement alone is actionable means
that a husband would be liable for having persuaded his wife to leave
a job in order to marry him. If X persuaded Y to leave his job and Y
then hired his services to Z, would the prior employer then have ac-
tions against both X and Z, one for the enticing and one for the hiring?
A literal construction of Section 8559 standing alone may require
such a result but the Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that the
statute must be construed as a whole'" and Section 8560 indicates
that only subsequent employers are within its condemnation.
An act which places such restrictions on freedom of contract should
be strictly construed if it is to be retained at all. Its application
should certainly be limited to contracts for employment for a term
142. Id. at 57.
143. 9 Tenn. App. 678 (W.S. 1929).
144. Jordan v. Lewis, 162 Tenn. 953, 39 S.W.2d 743 (1931).
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and possibly to subsequent employers of agricultural laborers who
have breached such contracts. Should the state's highest court ever
consider these questions it is hoped that it will look beyond the literal
terms of the enticement statute, as it did with the "white cap"
statute,14 5 and adopt such an interpretation. Rights guaranteed by
federal legislation would prevent its application to union activities
in industries in interstate commerce. The picketing-free speech
doctrine might preclude a denial of rights of picketing and persuasion
in intrastate situations. However, if the proper approach is taken to
the statute, these constitutional questions need not arise.
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Union Security Clauses.-The trend of the common law towards
favoring concerted employee action to secure closed or union shop
agreements has been effectively arrested by state and federal legis-
lation on the subject. The Taft-Hartley Act forbids all closed shop
agreements and permits the union shop with certain limitations.
140
An increasing number of states have outlawed all forms of union
security.147 Tennessee joined this group in 1947 by enacting its "right
to work" statute 48 which provides in section 11412.8:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association
of any kind to deny or attempt to deny employment to any person by
reason of such person's membership, affiliation with, resignation from,
or refusal to join or affiliate with any labor union or employee organ-
ization of any kind.
145. Trotter and Arnold v. State, 158 Tenn. 264, 266, 12 S.W.2d 951, 953
(1929). "In construing a statute, the court may with propriety, recur to the
history of the times when it was passed. This is often necessary in order to
ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it.
The court should place itself in the situation of the legislature to ascertain
the necessity and intent of the statute and then give such construction to the
language used as to carry such intention into effect, so far as it can be gathered
from the terms of the statute. Things that are within the intention of the
makers of a statute are as much within the statute as if they were within the
letter thereof. And things, although within the letter of the statute, are not
truly within the statute unless they be within the intention of the framers."
This statement should be contrasted with the literalistic approach of the
Southern Ry. case to the enticement statute, supra note 142.
146. Section 8(a) (3). 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3) (Supp.
1953).
147. In 1950 twelve states had measures which effectively outlawed all
forms of union security. These were Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Delaware and New Hampshire had repealed
such statutes. Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 477, 479 (1950). Alabama, Mississippi,
Nevada, and South Carolina have since enacted such statutes and none have
since been repealed. For general discussion of these measures, see Brown,
State Protection of the Right to Work, 3 LABOR L.J. 32 (1953); Whiting, The
Right to Work, 30 DICTA 303 (1953) Note, 36 VA. L. R.v. 477 (1950). Ala-
bama's recent enactment is discussed in 6 ALA. L. Rzv. 129 (1953).
148. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11412.8-11412.11 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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Section 11412.9 makes it unlawful to enter a contract providing for
the objectives outlawed in the first section. Section 11412.10 then
forbids exclusion from employment for payment of, or failure to pay,
union dues or assessments. Section 11412.11 then exempts contracts
"in force" when the act is passed, but provides that it shall apply
to new contracts and renewals or extensions of existing contracts.
Criminal sanctions are provided in Section 11412.12 with each day of
violation made a separate offense.
Most of the reported litigation concerning this Act concerns its
constitutionality and its application to contracts in force at thd time
of its passage. Both are moot questions now and merit little discussion.
By protecting both union and nonunion employees from discrim-
ination the Act outlaws the "yellow dog" contract, by which an
employer exacts as a condition of employment a warranty that the
employee will not join a union. In 1920 the Tennessee Supreme
Court held in Nashville Railway and Light Co. v. Lawsoni49 that such
contracts violate no public policy of the State and enjoined a union
organizer from inducing employees under such contracts to join
the union. Although federal legislation has forbidden such contracts
in interstate commerce since 1935,150 the Lawson case was the law
of Tennessee until the enactment of the Open Shop Law.
In Mascari v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,151 its con-
stitutionality was upheld and the United States Supreme Court soon
affirmed the correctness of that decision by upholding similar statutes
of Nebraska and North Carolina. 52 In answer to the argument that
the statutes denied equal protection of the law, the highest court
noted that both acts, like that of Tennessee, protected employees
from denials of employment because of union affiliation, as well as for
lack of such affiliations. The question of whether restricting an em-
ployer's freedom to contract exclusively for union labor denied him
due process of law was answered by a reference to the trend of con-
stitutional decisions since 1934 in which the Court had permitted
expanding state intervention into business and industrial conditions.
Justice Black's opinion concluded, "Just as we have held that the
due process clause erects no obstacle to block legislative protection
of union members, we now hold that legislative protection can be
afforded non-union workers."'53
Two lower Tennessee courts disagreed on the applicability of the
149. 144 Tenn. 78, 229 S.W. 741 (1921), following Hitchman Coal and Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
150. By making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
because of union affiliation.
151. 187 Tenn. 345, 215 S.W.2d 779 (1948), cert. dismissed 335 U.S. 907
(1949).
152. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., and
Whitaker v. North Carolina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (two cases).
153. Id. at 537.
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Act to closed shop contracts which contained automatic extension
clauses. In both cases the contract was to run for one year and
thereafter until a party gave a certain number of days' notice. In
the chancellor's unreported opinion in the Mascari case5 4 it was
held that when such a clause operated, it was a "renewal or extension"
within Section 11412.11 and that the Act therefore outlawed it. In
Phillips v. Stove Mounters International Union,'r also unreported,
it was held that the act contemplated only renewals or extensions
effected by affirmative action of the parties. The state supreme court
considered in American Federation of Labor v. Roane-Anderson Co.15
the Act's effect upon an executory contract. A closed shop contract
had been signed two days before the statute was passed but was not to
become effective for one week. It held that the statute applied. In
Federal Firefighters of Oak Ridge v. Roane-Anderson Co.,5 7 the su-
preme court allowed voluntary dismissal of an appeal from a ruling
that the statute applied to a closed shop contract which had not been
reduced to writing and was within the statute of frauds upon the
effective date of the Act.158
In Combustion Engineering Co. v. Thompson,0 9 the Tennessee
Supreme Court declined to render a declaratory judgment on a closed
shop contract which had expired after the law's passage. The question
of the employer's refusal to discharge a nonunion man under the con-
tract while it had still been valid was regarded as moot because he
could now re-hire him immediately if he did so.
A question of continuing interest was presented by Dukes v.
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers.60 Dukes
charged that the union had caused his discharge by making false and
malicious statements to his employer that Dukes had been expelled
from the union and demanding that Dukes be fired or else the union
would go on strike. It was held that one count in the declaration
stated a cause of action for malicious interference with Duke's em-
ployment. A second count, however, was based upon an alleged viola-
tion of the Open Shop Law, Section 11412.8, which forbids exclusion
from employment of nonunion employees, and Section 11412.10, which
forbids such exclusion for nonpayment of union dues. The demurrer
154. Mascari v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 13 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 64,036
(Ch. Ct. Shelby Co., Sept. 22, 1947). When the case reached the supreme court
this question had apparently become moot. The parties had then agreed on
a closed shop provision to be effective if the Open Shop Law were declared
unconstitutional.
155. 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 65,537 (Cir. Ct. Hamilton Co., Nov. 28, 1949).
156. 185 Tenn. 363, 206 S.W.2d 386 (1947).
157. 185 Tenn. 320, 206 S.W.2d 369 (1947).
158. The facts of the case do not appear in the supreme court's opinion but
may be found in the report of the chancellor's decision at 12 CCH LAB. CAS.
ff 63,782 (Ch. Ct. Anderson Co., Apr. 15, 1947).
159. 191 Tenn. 98, 231 S.W.2d 580 (1950).
160. 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W.2d 7 (1950).
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to this count was sustained because "These two sections of the Code,
as relied upon by the plaintiff are not applicable herein because they
are directed toward the employer and not to any situation as repre-
sented by the declaration herein."'161
This holding is certainly correct in its interpretation of what con-
stitutes a violation of the Open Shop Law. Its terms are such that it
is violated only by an employer who denies employment to a non-
union man under the first or third sections and by both the employer
and the union if they enter a union security agreement within the
second section. Since no such contract was alleged, Dukes alleged
no criminal conduct on the union's part and the employer was not
named as a defendant.
Assuming that Duke's employer violated the Open Shop Law, is
the union guilty of tortious conduct by threatening to strike and thus
inducing the employer to commit a crime? It is well established
that picketing for an invalid closed shop contract is unlawful and may
be enjoined.16 2 It is also generally held that a strike for an unlawful
objective may be enjoined.163 Of course a court cannot compel indi-
vidual workers to remain at their jobs by injunction. This would be
involuntary servitude forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. But
a concerted refusal to work may be enjoined and a union may be
enjoined from inducing such concerted action.0 4
If a strike for violations of the Open Shop Law is tortious, then
a threat to strike should be actionable at the instance of one injured
as a direct and intended result. To limit union civil responsibility
under this law to cases where it signs a closed shop contract, or en-
gages in open picketing to compel the execution of one, will seriously
impair its effectiveness. With the law's heavy criminal penalties no
union is apt to ask for such a contract, but employers may be pres-
sured to discharge nonunion men whom a strong union finds objec-
tionable, and may choose to comply in the interests of harmonious
union relations. Unless such pressures are penalized the law can
be effectively circumvented.
The only possibility for a valid union security clause in Tennessee
is under the Railway Labor Act which permits union shop agreements
notwithstanding the provisions of any state law.10 5 This would seem
161. Id. at 497, 235 S.W.2d at 9.
162. Supra, p. 82.
163. Int'l Union, United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd.,
336 U.S. 245 (1949).
164. Justices Rutledge and Murphy concurring in the Whitaker and Federal
Union cases, supra note 152, emphasized that no strike was involved and
questioned whether the concerted refusal of union men to work with non-
union men could be denied under the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequent
decisions seem to have ignored this issue. See FORKOScH, A TREATISE ON
LABOR LAW 489 (1953).
165. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (11) (1954).
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to pre-empt the field of railway agreements, but the few decisions on
the question are divided.166
If an invalid closed shop clause is included in a collective agree-
ment, what is its effect upon the other provisions? The United States
Supreme Court held that it was severable and did not invalidate the
balance of the agreement, thus allowing the employer to enforce a
no-strike clause against the union.
167
Enforcement of Collective Agreements.-After some initial hesita-
tion, the great majority of states now regard the collective agreement
as a valid and enforceable obligation. Since violation of such an agree
ment is not an unfair labor practice under federal law, remedies for
breach lie in state courts and in federal court under Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
Since the parties to a collective agreement are the employer and
the union, there may be a question in a given case whether an indi-
vidual employee may bring suit to enforce its provisions. This should
depend upon analysis of the particular provision involved. Insofar
as the contract establishes wage rates, seniority rights and other
conditions of individual employment, it is usually intended to confer
individual rights upon the employees covered. However, there may
be other provisions which by their terms or nature are not intended
to benefit the employees as individuals. An arbitration clause may be
so phrased as to indicate that it is to be invoked only at the instance
of the union. 6 A suit by individual employees to enforce a union
security clause may be unsuccessful because it is in the nature of a
contract only as between the employer and the union.6 0
In 1928 the Tennessee Supreme Court allowed an employee to sue
for damages for breach of a collective agreement, treating it as the
"basis of the contract of employment" between the employer and
each of his employees.'7 0 In a later case in the court of appeals the
right of an employee to enforce provisions of a collective employ-
ment was dealt with more at length. The court held that the employee
was a third party beneficiary of pro'Cedures provided by the contract
to be followed in discharge cases.
17'
166. For holdings that state law is inapplicable, see In re Florida East Coast
Ry., 24 CCH LAB. CAs. f 67,806 (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Fla. 1953); Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 26 CCH LAB. CAS. % 68,640 (Richmond City Ct., Va.
1954); contra, Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R., 24 CCH LAB. CAS. 68,095 (Dist.
Ct., Douglas Co., Neb. 1954); Sandsberry v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry
25 CCH LAB. CAS. T 68,128 (Dist. Ct., Potter Co., Tex. 1954) In re Florida East
Coast Ry., 24 CCH LAB. CAS. 67,806 (Fla. 1953).
167. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
168. Cf. Curtis v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 282 App. Div. 183, 121 N.Y.
S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1953).
169. MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1950).
170. Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).




Although no Tennessee cases have denied an employee the right
to claim the benefits of a collective agreement one case in particular
leaves some doubts as to the exact nature of the relation of the indi-
vidual employee to the collective agreement. In Earle v. Illinois
Central R.R.172 the court of appeals considered a contract which
provided that seniority rights were preserved for employees who
were out of service less than six months by virtue of layoffs. The
complainant had been laid off for a longer period but returned to
work four days during the interim. In an action for reinstatement and
damages he claimed he was not "out of service" for the prescribed
period and therefore the defendant's refusal to reemploy him had
wrongfully deprived him of seniority rights.
In a careful and exhaustive process of construction the court in
the Earle case looked beyond the contract's language to the plant's
"extra board practice" and concluded that the employee was not
"in service" on the odd days worked because he was not listed on the
"regular extra board." By custom and practice those not so listed
were regarded as doing emergency work and not in regular service
within the meaning of the seniority provisions. A decree in the com-
plainant's favor was reversed.
This result seems sound but it was reached on two bases. The court
first regarded the employee's rights as arising from his individual
contract of employment and not the collective agreement which
was merely the basis for the individual contracts of employees who
"entered or continued in the service of such employer with knowledge
of its existence."'7 3 The complainant's suit was regarded as enforcing
his individual contract which was in part the collective agreement
but which also contained "additional terms of local application which
. . . rested solely in parol or were implied from the circumstances
under which in some instances he worked."'7 4 To the extent that the
Earle case may be taken as holding that an employer and employee
may enter an individual contract which is inconsistent with the col-
lective agreement,'7 5 it is believed to be unsound-at least in contracts
under the National Labor Relations Act. It is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to negotiate individually with his employees if a
collective agreement is in effect. The United States Supreme Court
held in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB'7 6 that individual contracts were no bar
to a union's efforts to negotiate a contract for all the employees in a
172. 25 Tenn. App. 660, 167 S.W.2d 15 (W.S. 1942).
173. Id. at 674, 167 S.W.2d at 25.
174. Id. at 675, 167 S.W.2d at 25.
175. The court relied on a dictum in Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157
Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692, 694 (1928), which indicated that the collective agree-
ment became each employee's individual contract in the absence of incon-
sistent agreements.
176. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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bargaining unit. This is necessitated by the Congressional mandate
that the terms of employment fixed by collective bargaining shall be
the terms for all employments within the unit. In view of this statu-
tory policy inconsistent employment contracts should not be recog-
nized.
The second basis of the Earle opinion is not so questionable and
justifies this aspect of the court's holding. The court regarded the
evidence of the extra board practice as parol evidence admissible
to show the practical construction that the parties placed on the
phrase "in continuous service." Unless collective agreements are to
be intolerably detailed and inelastic such evidence of custom and
usage must be used in applying the contract to particular situations.
Therefore proof of the "extra board practice" and the fact that failure
to list an employee on the regular extra board meant the parties
regarded his work as temporary in nature was properly considered in
deciding whether the plaintiff's lay off was terminated or whether
he continued "out of service" and thus lost his seniority.
The restoration of seniority rights was also the subject of an em-
ployee's suit in McClure v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. 177
McClure, a telegraph operator, had joined the defendant's transporta-
tion department in 1912, but in 1917 he voluntarily left it to take a
job with its separately managed freight department. He was then
drafted and while he was in service the government seized the rail-
roads and ordered that established seniority rights were to be pre-
served for returning veterans and that efforts were to be made to
provide jobs for those who had no seniority rights. During his absence
telegraph operators organized and secured a contract recognizing
departmental seniority. Upon McClure's return he was denied his
former job but was given another. He was unsuccessful in his suit
claiming seniority rights dating from 1912.
'The court of appeals reasoned that any seniority rights the com-
plainant may have had in 1917 were lost by his voluntary transfer
to an independent department. Although a stibsequent agreement in
1924 provided for retention of seniority upon interdepartmental trans-
fers, it was not retroactive so as to affect rights as they existed in
1917. Since he had no seniority rights in 1917, the Government order
was of no assistance to him. The court further held that since a suc-
cessful action by McClure would displace thirty-three employees of
lesser seniority, they should have been made parties to the suit. This
aspect of the holding is highly questionable and has been applied in
no other case.
It should be noted that both the Earle and McClure cases involved
railway employees' suits which primarily sought specific performance
177. 16 Tenn. App. 369, 64 S.W.2d 538 (E.S. 1933).
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by a restoration of seniority rights. Under the Tennessee Supreme
Court's subsequent holding in Broome v. Louisville and Nashville
R.R.17 8 the state courts' jurisdiction is limited to actions at law
for damages if the contract is subject to the Railway Labor Act.
Therefore actions of the type involved in these two cases should not
arise again in Tennessee courts.
The usual remedies under collective contracts are specific perform-
ance for the restoration of rights, an action for damages, an injunction
against breach, or a declaratory judgment. The latter was involved
in Combustion Engineering Co. v. Thompson,'7 9 whose vexing facts
cannot arise again. The union and employer had a closed shop agree-
ment which apparently expired six months after the Open Shop Law
was passed. But before it expired the union asked that certain em-
ployees be fired for non-payment of union dues. The employer sought
a declaratory judgment as to his duty under the contract because the
union threatened suit if he did not discharge the men, and the em-
ployees threatened suit if he did. The chancellor held that contract
was valid when the employees became delinquent and that the em-
ployer's duty was to fire them. The court of appeals reversed'8 0 and
the supreme court affirmed. By the time the suit was brought the
contract had expired and if the employer now fired the employees he
could immediately re-hire them because of the Open Shop Law.
The union insisted that he perform his contractual duty anyway
because a discharge would end their seniority rights and thus benefit
the union men. Seniority rights were held to be too "nebulous" for
declaratory relief.
The opinion should not be taken to imply that seniority rights can
never be the subject of a declaratory judgment. They generally, as in,
this case, are so qualified by factors of skill, physical handicaps, etc.,
that they may appear "nebulous" if an attempt is made to gauge
their effect before a given situation, such as promotion or lay off,
calls for application of seniority standards. But an employee may
have a present definite right, by virtue of length of service, that these
agreed standards are to be applied to his position for lay off or pro-
motion purposes. The Combustion Co. case seems sound because of
the declaratory judgment problem. There was no justiciable contro-
versy until the employees were fired, re-hired, and at some time in the
future claimed benefits of prior seniority.
That seniority benefits are purely the product of the collective
agreement and are circumscribed by it is emphasized by Sanders v.
Louisville and Nashville R.R.,18 . a case arising in Tennessee and
178. 194 Tenn. 249, 250 S.W.2d 93 (1952)4 See p. 80 supra.
179. 191 Tenn. 98, 231 S.W.2d 580 (1950) .
180. The court of appeals' opinion is reported at 16 CCH LAB. CAs. 65,114
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1949).
181. 144 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1944).
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decided by the Sixth Circuit. During a layoff Sanders had failed to
report his address every sixty days as required by the contract in
order to preserve seniority. He argued that this was unnecessary be-
cause the person to whom he was to report knew his address at all
times. The contract terms were applied literally and Sanders was
denied a declaratory judgment re-establishing seniority. An alterna-
tive basis was that his action was based on contract and accrued
more than six years past, when he was dropped from the seniority
roster. He was therefore barred by the Tennessee statute of limita-
tions.
Turner v. Tennessee Products Co. 8 2 denied an action for vacation
benefits on a contract executed by the government while the mines
were seized and which on resumption of private ownership was not
expressly adopted by the owners. The problems raised have been
well analyzed elsewhere 83 and need not be considered here.
An uncertain question in Tennessee law is whether an employee
may resort to the courts before exhausting the procedures provided
in the contract for settlement of grievances. In the Earle'8 4 case the
complainant had partially pursued those remedies and after initial
rulings against him brought this action. The court of appeals held
that since he asserted a "property right" he could go directly to the
courts for relief. It is the general rule, however, that the parties
to a contract may either impliedly or expressly make submission to
arbitration or other contractual tribunals a condition precedent to a
suit on the contract. 8 5 The only Tennessee authority cited by the
court of appeals to the contrary is a case where a member of a mutual
benefit society sued on an insurance contract without appealing to the
association's internal tribunals. But in that case the court stated:
"... where property rights are involved, as here, a member may first
bring suit without appealing to the judicatories within the order,
unless there is found incorporated in the laws of the order, or the
contract, an express inhibition to the contrary. . . . No such express
inhibition is contained in the constitution or by-laws of the Society
herein." 8 6
If the mere assertion of a property right is held to excuse a failure to
exhaust contractual remedies there would be few employee's suits
182. 36 Tenn. App. 77, 251 S.W.2d 441 (E.S. 1952).
183. Sanders, Labor Law-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1197
(1953).
184. Earle v. Illinois Central R.R., 25 Tenn. App. 660, 167 S.W.2d 15 (W.S.
1942).
185. Pettus v. Olga Coal Co., 72 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1952); Note, 117 A.L.R.
301 (1938).
186. Atkinson v. Railroad Employees Mutual Relief Soc., 160 Tenn. 158, 167,
22 S.W.2d 631, 633 (1929).
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which could not be brought to the courts in the first instance. A
contractual requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies would
be almost meaningless.
The only other decisions cited on this point in the Earle case were
those of the federal courts in Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.18 7 which
held merely that the Railway Labor Act did not require that an em-
ployee apply to the Railway Adjustment Board before suing for
damages. It has since been held that state law is controlling in this
matter.1
88
The only case in which the Tennessee Supreme Court has consid-
ered the question is Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault. 89 There an
employee sued for damages for a discharge which violated the collec-
tive agreement. His failure to appeal to the board of arbitration
as provided in the contract was pleaded by the employer as a defense.
The court did not even consider the possibility that the plaintiff had
no duty to first exhaust this remedy, but held that he was excused
because of the employer's repudiation of two previous decisions of
the board and announcement that he would not abide by its awards.
The right of minority members of a union to enjoin the execution
of a new contract or the performance of an existing one arose in
Haynes v. United Chemical Workers.190 The plaintiffs were about to
be discharged in accordance with seniority provisions which gave
newly employed veterans seniority credit based on years in military
service. As a result the plaintiffs were being laid off before veterans
who had joined the employer later than they. The relief was denied,
the court holding the contract violated no public policy but instead
accorded with state and federal statutory policy favoring employment
benefits for servicemen. On identical facts the United States Supreme
Court agreed in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,'9' citing the Haynes case
in reaching its decision. Although seniority benefits are rights of
value they are solely the product of the collective agreement and may
be altered by the union and employer by a new contract for any
reasonable purpose or upon a change of business conditions. 92 They
are protected from arbitrary or capricious action however. 9 3 It is
187. Illinois Central R.R. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1940), rev'd,
312 U.S. 630 (1941).
188. Transcontinental & Western Airline, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
189. 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).
190. 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S.W.2d 101 (1950).
191. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
192. Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich.
201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938); Leeder v. Okla. Cities Service Oil Co., 199 Okla.
618, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
193. Piercy v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042
(1923); Belanger v. Local Division No. 1128, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street




the union's duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit
in negotiating an agreement.
194
INTEmNAL UNIoN AFFAIRS
A labor organization is theoretically like any other unincorporated'
association and the law of its internal operations has been fashioned
from the rules governing such organizations generally. But it is
unique in at least two important respects; first, under modern legis-
lation giving organized labor the right of collective bargaining, the
union is an intermediary which controls the members' relation to a
third party, their mutual employer; secondly, a member's status with
the union may have a serious effect upon his right to pursue his trade.
For these reasons much litigation has arisen concerning internal union
operations and it has practically developed a case law of its own,
The first law which governs union affairs is the members' self-
imposed law, the constitution and by-laws. Methods of procedure
and a hierarchy of tribunals are provided for internal settlement of
disputes. A basic question in this area is the extent to which the
courts will intervene in the operations of this structure and afford
relief from its administration.
Cases presenting this problem start from the proposition that one
who is aggrieved by an action of his association cannot resort to the
courts until he has first exhausted his remedies within the organiza-
tion. 95 One of the situations where the courts have been quick to
find exceptions to this rule is where members allege fraud on the part
of the officers.196
In Wilson v. Miller,197 the Tennessee Supreme Court allowed a class
action against union officers to be brought by a member on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated seeking relief from fraud and
mismanagement in the union's operations. The bill sought an account-
ing for funds allegedly defalcated over an eleven-year period, restitu-
tion of union assets, and a decree ordering a court-supervised election
to end minority domination. The union constitution and by-laws pro-
vided for settlement through internal procedures as a condition of
any court action, but it was alleged that any such appeal would be
useless because final decision lay with the International President who
had been indifferent to past complaints. It was held that the chan-
194. Steel v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
195. Barthell v. Zachman, 162 Tenn. 336, 36 S.W.2d 886 (1931); Murray v. Su-
preme Hive, 112 Tenn. 679, 80 S.W. 827 (1904). See Vorenberg, Exhaustion of
Intraunion Remedies, 2 LABOR L.J. 487 (1951). Cases are collected at 168
A.L.R. 1462 (1947).
196. See SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 934 (1953). The con-
clusion there is that the courts will intervene here "simply on the realistic
ground that patently unlawful acts have been committed."
197. Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1904).
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cellor properly took jurisdiction of the entire matter and that failure
to exhaust internal remedies is excused where such an attempt would
be "futile, illusory or vain."
Where union finances are in jeopardy a variety of relief may be
appropriate in equity. The alleged inadequacy of union financial
procedures and personnel in the Wilson case justified granting an
accounting; to preserve the property of the union a receiver may be
required, although none was sought in that case; and the additional
remedy of supervised elections is available if past elections have been
fraudulent or it is necessary to insure proper union administration in
the future.193
Intervention of the national union into a similar situation in the
local gave rise to Liming v. Maloney.'9 The defendant, acting under
his constitutional power as International President, had taken pos-
session of the local's property, removed its officers and appointed new
ones. On appeal from an unsuccessful suit to set aside this action
the court of appeals affirmed. It held firsf that the evidence showed
the action to have been justified and in the local's best interests be-
cause of disorderly meetings, exorbitant officer's salaries and financial
mismanagement. It held, secondly, that in any event the plaintiffs
should have exhausted their remedies within the organization before
resorting to the courts.
This second basis troubled Judge McAmis who concurred on the
first grounds alone. And well he might, because it was alleged that
appeal lay to the International Convention which met only once in
four years and that such an appeal would be futile because it lay to
those who had acted wrongfully. This latter allegation, if proved,
would bring the case within the rule excusing exhaustion of internal
remedies where the appeal would be futile, illusory, or vain as an-
nounced in Watson v. Wilson.20 0 But an exception is also applied, at
least in members' actions for wrongful expulsion, where internal
procedures would cause undue delay.201 Whether the fact that the
198. Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940); Collins v.
Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 Ati. 37 (Ch.
1935); Chalgian v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 114 N.J. Eq. 497, 169 Atl.
327 (1933); Local No. 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers v. McKee. 114 N.J. Eq. 555, 169 Ati. 351 (1933); Dusing v. Nuzzo,
177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Washington Local Lodge No.
104 v. Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash. 2d 14, 203 P.2d 1019
(1949). See Chamberlain, The Judicial Process in Labor Unions, 10 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 145 (1940); Pressman, Appointment of Receivers for Labor
Unions, 42 YALE L.J. 1244 (1933); Summers, Union Powers and Workers'
Right, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 805 (1951).
199. 17 CCH LAB. CAs. 65,558 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1950).
200. 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
201. Local Union No. 57 v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944), (two
and one half months an undue delay); Kaplan v. Elliott, 145 Misc. 863, 261
N.Y. Supp. 112 (1932) (eighteen months an undue delay). See Note, 35 COL.
L. REV. 951 (1935); Note, 168 A.L.R. 1462 (1947).
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convention met only once in four years meant undue delay in the
Liming case depends of course upon the date of the next meeting
which does not appear from the opinion. The court did not consider
this question.
Although Judge McAmis declined to pass on the question as to
whether the union by-laws provided for an adequate and speedy
settlement, he concurred in the holding because the evidence was
such that had the plaintiffs exhausted their union remedies and lost,
the court upon then reviewing the action would not have upset it.
In other words the plaintiffs had lost nothing by the court's taking
jurisdiction. But in such an action it is the defendant who resists the
court's entertaining the action and asks that a member complaining
of union procedures be held to his contractual agreement to utilize
internal tribunals. If there is no rule of law which excuses the dis-
sident member from following procedures prescribed in the by-laws
and constitution, does not a court remake their contract by adjudi-
cating his dispute? If updn his proof no actual justification is shown
for the departure from agreed methods, should not the action be dis-
missed? Unless these questions are answered in the affirmative, the
mere allegation of an excuse for failure to exhaust internal remedies
is sufficient to evade the rule and any member can force the union
into court to defend against real or imagined grievance.
A further question raised in the Liming case was whether the com-
plainants asserted a "property right" which excused them from failure
to exhaust internal remedies. This exception is of long standing and
,probably arose where a member expelled from a fraternal benefit
society later sued on a policy of insurance.202 The complainants in
Liming alleged that members' rights in $180,000 worth of the local's
property were at stake. The court refused to apply the property right
exception and gave it little discussion. The holding on this point
appears to be sound. To regard a member's undivided interest in
jointly owned union assets as a property right for this purpose would
allow all disputes of this sort and all wrongful expulsion claims to
be litigated in the courts in the first instance.
20 3
The clause under which the defendant acted in the Liming case
suggests a problem which has become of increasing concern to the
courts and to scholars in this field. It gave the International President
arbitrary power to suspend and expel local officers and to take over
202. See Atkinson v. Railroad Employee's Mutual Relief Society. 160 Tenn.
158, 22 S.W.2d 631 (1929).
203. A different approach is warranted if the dispute is between the local
and national organizations. Here it is generally held that if property rights
are involved the local's charter may not be revoked without a fair trial. Ellis
v. American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal. App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941);
Furniture Workers Union, Local 1007 v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners, 6 Wash. 2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940).
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local assets without notice or trial. The Washington Supreme Court
has indicated that such a clause is contrary to public policy and action
under it will be enjoined.20 4 Another court regarded a clause giving
similar powers as innocuous because of the International President's
presumed insulation "from local prejudices and antipathies. '20 5 The
problem suggested is that of the growing centralization of power in
national organizations at the expense of locals. It is evidenced by a
tendency to increase the powers of the national president 2 6 and the
move towards bargaining on a nationwide basis.
207
Tennessee would probably recognize the numerous other exceptions
with which the courts have weakened the exhaustion rule.2 0 8 Internal
remedies need not be exhausted where'an expelled member sues for
damages rather than reinstatement,20 9 or where initial proceedings
did not accord a fair trial,210 or the trial body lacked jurisdiction,21
or the proceedings did not comply with rules or constitutional provi-
sions.21 2 The exhaustion rule is still applicable, however, in the absence
of some such showing.
213
The question of the duty of union officials to instruct a member
concerning the union's rules and regulations arose in the unreported
case of McAfee v. Chattanooga Paper Products Workers Specialty
Union.2 1 4 The plaintiff had been discharged under a valid closed-shop
contract which made "bad standing" in the union a basis for discharge.
While laid off from her job she became delinquent in the payment of
dues to the international. Union officers had told her she was excused
from paying local dues but made no mention of the international
204. Washington Local Lodge, No. 104 v. Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
33 Wash. 2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949).
205. Gleeson v. Conrad, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
206. See the clause setting forth the power of James L. Petrillo of the
Musicians Union, admittedly an extreme case, in SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 931 (1953).
207. See Chamberlain, The Judicial Processes in Labor Unions, 10 BRooK-
LYN L. REV. 145 (1940); Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Unions, 50
YALE L.J. 621 (1941); TELLER, A LABOR POLICY FOR AmERICA 67 (1945).
208. See Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LABOR L.J. 487
(1951).
209. Porth v. Local Union 201, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners, 231 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1952); Grand Int'l Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923).
210. Johnson v. Int'l Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 52 Nev. 400,
288 Pac. 170 (1930) (due notice); Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992
(1918) (double jeopardy); contra, Simpson v. Grand Int'l Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 83 W.Va. 355, 98 S.E. 580 (1919); Brooks v. Engar,
259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 114 (1st Dept. 1940) (secret evidence); Calleg-
her v. Monoghan, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 618 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1945) (unreasonable
place of trial). See Note, 21 A.L.R. 2d 1937 (1952).
211. Walsh v. Reardon, 274 Mass. 530, 174 N.E. 912 (1931); Gersh v. Ross,
283 App. Div. 552, 265 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dept. 1933).
212. Leo v. Local Union No. 612, 126 Wash. 2d 498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946).
213. Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S.W.2d 101
(1950); Liming v. Maloney, 225 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1949).
214. 17 CCH LAB. CAs. f 65,558 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1950).
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"per capita tax." The union constitution and by-laws made delin-
quency in this automatic "bad standing." She sued the union alleging
that it caused her discharge because she was the sister-in-law of a
nonunion foreman and also that the union officers violated a duty to
instruct her as to the union rules regarding the per capita tax, and
furthermore should have granted her a hearing on her bad standing
status. The court of appeals upheld a dismissal of her suit. The evi-
dence was such that it could have been found she was fired for her
bad standing and not for her relation to the foreman. Since she had
a copy of the union constitution and by-laws and knew that good
standing in the union was a condition of her employment, there was
no duty upon the officers to instruct her as to union rules. It was not
necessary that she be adjudged by the union to be in bad standing
because under the by-laws this was automatic when she defaulted in
payment of the per capita tax. The result seems harsh to this point
but the court left a way out upon other facts by this observation:
"There is no proof that she was denied a reasonable opportunity to
place herself in good standing. She does not claim that she ever made
a tender of the per capita tax."215
Wilson v. Mi~ler216 established that in Tennessee a class suit much
in the nature of a stockholder's derivative action may be available
to union members to reach officers who default in their duties. This
device is useful in order to make the union a party defendant so that
the court may have jurisdiction over its assets.
ARBrrRATION
It is generally accepted that voluntary arbitration is a desirable
and expedient method of settling labor disputes, 217 and a standard
feature of collective agreements is a provision that arbitration is to be
the terminal point of all grievance procedures.2I " However, Tennessee,
like the majority of states, has a general arbitration statute219 which
is ill-designed to meet the realities of modern labor relations. Unlike
modern statutes' which provide for the specific enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes, 220 Tennessee recognizes only the
215. Id. at p. 76,901.
216. 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 275 (1952).
217. See Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Awards in Labor Dis-
putes, 17 U. or Car. L. REV. 233, 252-255 (1950).
218. The Bureau of Labor Statistics found in 1952 that 89% of collective
agreements provide for arbitration of future disputes. FORKOscI, A TREATISE
ON LABOR LAW 852, n. 77 (1953).
219. TsN. CODE A2Nx. §§ 9359-9382 (Williams 1934).
220. Seventeen states have such statutes, but only ten of these enforce
future disputes when they are contained in collective labor agreements.
FRIEDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS 2 (1952).
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submission of existing "causes of action" to arbitration.221 The com-
mon-law rule that submission to arbitration may be revoked at any
time before award22 can be avoided by making the submission a rule
of court by entering it of record or by a written agreement that it be so
entered.223 The award must be docketed with the court specified in
the submission224 and in a suit thereon it may be rejected for "any legal
and sufficient reason. 225 The statute was strengthened in 1946, how-
ever, by its amendment to provide for the appointment of an arbi-
trator by the court should a party fail to appoint one as provided
in a submission agreement.
226
Despite the unavailability of the remedy of specific performance,
arbitration agreements apparently are widely used in Tennessee. A
reference to published arbitration decisions shows a substantial num-
ber of awards rendered in this state upon collective agreements in
effect in Tennessee industries.227 This is probably due to the fact
that in firms enjoying good labor relations the enforcement of such
clauses depends upon the good faith of the parties rather than upon
effective legal sanctions. Nor are agreements to arbitrate without legal
effect in Tennessee. It may be that submission to arbitration is a
condition precedent to an action on the contract.228 If a party refuses
to perform an agreement to arbitrate, an action for damages should
be available.229 Such an action has been held to lie in federal court
under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.230 It is almost universally
held that an action may be brought upon an award rendered upon an
executed agreement for arbitration of future disputes.23'
221. Section 9359 provides that "all causes of action whether there be a
suit pending or not" may be submitted to arbitration with certain exceptions
not material here. This requirement of a justiciable controversy would elimi-
nate some labor disputes even if submitted to arbitration, e.g., a dispute relat-
ing to terms of a new contract. See In re Buffalo and Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275,
165 N.E. 291 (1929); Gregory and Orlikoff, supra note 217, at 248-52.
222. Key v. Norrod, 124 Tenn. 146, 136 S.W. 991 (1911); Dougherty v. Mc-
Whorter, 15 Tenn. 239 (1834).
223. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9367 (Williams 1934); Key v. Norrod, supra note
222. If the dispute is before a court, the common law rule applies and a parol
submission is valid. Common-law and statutory arbitration exist concurrently
in Tennessee. Halliburton v. Flowers, 59 Tenn. 25 (1873).
224. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9375-9376 (Williams 1934).
225. Id. § 9377.
226. Id. § 9361 (1952 Supp.).
227. See e.g., American Metal Products Co., 22 LABoa ARBroRATioN REPoRTg
181 (Union City, Feb. 18, 1954); Crane Co., 20 LABOR ARBroRATioN REPORTS
561 (Chattanooga, Apr. 20, 1953); Florence Stove Co., 19 LABOR ARBrrRATION
REPORTS 650 (Lewisburg, Sept. 23, 1952); Mead Corp., 20 LABOR AerrRTioX
REPORTS 25 (Harriman, Aug. 25, 1952).
228. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 91 Tenn. 525, 19 S.W. 672 (1892); Tolley Co.
v. Marr, 12 Tenn. App. 505 (E.S. 1931).
229. Berkoritz v. Arbib, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
230. Shirley-Herman Co. v. Int'l Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950);
Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C.
1950).
231. Note, 135 A.L.R. 85 (1941).
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It is unlikely that a future disputes clause entered into in a foreign
state which recognized them would be enforceable in Tennessee.
Since arbitration is regarded as remedial, the law of the forum is
generally applied.232 But an award rendered in a foreign state pur-
suant to a statute enforcing such clauses is entitled to full faith and
credit unless the forum regards the agreement as contrary to its public
policy.233 In Hirsch Fabrics Corp. v. Southern Athletic Co.,234 suit was
brought in the federal court for the Eastern District of Tennessee upon
an award rendered in New York. The parties, one of them a New
York corporation, had agreed that their contract was to be governed
by New York law and that any disputes were to be arbitrated accord-
ing to its statute which enforces future disputes clauses. Judge Taylor
held that the award was entitled to full faith and credit.2 35
Whether the Federal Arbitration Act 236 is available for the specific
enforcement of future disputes clauses in collective agreements is
an issue yet to be resolved.2 37 Most decisions have held that its exclu-
sion of contracts of employment of workers engaged in interstate
commerce makes it inapplicable.238 But a decision in the Third Circuit
holds that this excludes only collective agreements in industries which
are instrumentalities of commerce and applies the Act to an arbitra-
tion agreement in an industry which merely affects commerce.239
MISCELLANEOUS
State antitrust law-The Tennessee anti-monopoly statute240 has
never been applied to a typical employee organization. However, in
Bailey v. Association of Master Plumbers241 it was invoked against
a group of plumbing contractors who did plumbing work and also
sold the fixtures which they installed. A by-law of their association
provided a schedule of penalties to be paid to the association by
232. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate As-
pects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 728 (1934).
233. Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172
N.E. 689 (1929) (denying enforcement); contra, Gilbert v. Bernstein, 255 N.Y.
348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
234. 98 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
235. For an excellent discussion of conflicts problems in this field, see Stern,
The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
567 (1932).
236. 61 STAT. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 10-14 (1953).
237. See Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitra-
tion Under The United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 582
(1952).
238. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951), 193 F.2d
327 (3d Cir. 1952); Int'l Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hard-
ware Flooring, 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). See 65 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1952).
239. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers, 207 F.2d 450
(3d Cir. 1953).
240. TENN. CoDE AxN. §§ 5880-5886 (Williams 1934).
241. 103 Tenn. 99, 52 S.W. 853 (1899).
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members who did work in competition with other members. In a suit
brought to collect such penalties, the by-law was held invalid as an
unreasonable restraint of trade at common law and also as violating
the Tennessee antitrust law since it was destructive of competition
and arbitrarily raised prices to the public.
Since the statute applies to combinations which "tend to advance,
reduce, or control" prices, it literally might apply to traditional union
action for higher wages. Although such an application is unlikely,
Tennessee courts would probably follow the lead of federal decisions
242
under the Sherman Act and condemn alliances between unions and
employers which restrain competition and affect prices.
Such a situation is suggested by Lichter v. Fulcher243 although the
state antitrust statute was not invoked and the union was not a party.
The Nashville Mason Contractors Association and the local masons'
union agreed that the latter's members would work only for contrac-
tors approved by the association. An outside contractor was success-
ful in an action against the association and its officers for damages
caused when the arrangement interfered with its securing local union
labor. The defendants were held to be guilty of civil conspiracy in
attempting to control the supply of union mason labor and thus elimi-
nate outside competition for contracts. The Court of Appeals ob-
served:
The progress of labor in its efforts to attain reasonable hours, proper
working conditions and a fair wage has been slow. The progress made
thus far should not be jeopardized by an attempt by designing indi-
viduals to use the progress thus gained to serve entirely separate
interests.244
Labor disputes and unemployment benefits-The Tennessee unem-
ployment compensation statute245 disqualifies from receiving benefits
employees who are unemployed because of participation in a labor
dispute or membership in a "grade or class of workers . . . any of
whom are participating in the dispute. '246 Although this is now a com-
plete bar, prior to 1947 such disqualification was effective only for the
first four weeks of employment.
247
242. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). A Tennessee union was indicted under this
principle in United States v. Chattanooga Chapter, National Electrical Con-
tractors Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
243. 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (E.S. 1938).
244. Id. at 675, 125 S.W.2d at 507.
245. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6901.25-6901.44 (Williams Supp. 1952).
246. Id. § 6901.29 (E).
247. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.5 (d) (3) (Williams 1934).
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In its first decision under this provision 248 the state supreme court
held that a disqualifying "labor dispute" was present where the em-
ployer and union agreed that operations should cease until a new
contract had been negotiated. In Clinton v. Hake249 striking employees
were denied benefits upon a finding that they were "fully employed"'
in picketing the plant and therefore were neither unemployed nor
available for other suitable work. However, Milne Chair Co. v.
Blake250 refused to apply this reasoning where the pickets had been
discharged by the employer after going on strike and the employer
had rejected their offer to return to work.
Two cases have considered the position of nonunion employees
who are unemployed because the union's strike closes down the plant.
The Queener case251 granted such benefits to nonunion employees
limiting the disqualified "grade or class" of workers to those acting
in concert in the dispute. However, this decision was distinguished
in the Anderson case252 where the striking union had been certified
by the NLRB. Since such a union is the lawful bargaining agent for
all employees in its unit, all those within the unit are regarded as
within the same "grade or class" and thus disqualified from unemploy-
ment benefits. Since any union whose strike is strong enough to close
down a plant is likely to have won certification, successful strikes will
usually disqualify both union and nonunion employees from receiv-
ing benefits. Unions favor such a construction of these statutes be-
cause the contrary would cause defections from the union and weaken
strikes.
Ordinance requiring city to purchase union made goods.-In 1897
Nashville apparently had a strong and influential printers' union. A
city ordinance, passed in that year, required that all city printing
bear the union label of either the Nashville Allied Trades Council or
the International Typographical Union. In 1902, this enactment was
invalidated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Marshall & Bruce Co.
v. City of Nashvile.253 It conflicted with the city charter's require-
ment that such contracts be let out at competitive bidding to the
lowest responsible bidder. The ordinance was also held to be uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that it denied equal protection of the law
248. Block Coal and Coke Co. v. United Mine Workers, 177 Tenn. 247, 149.
S.W.2d 469 (1941).
249. 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947), followed in Adams v. American
Lava Corp., 188 Tenn. 69, 216 S.W.2d 728 (1948).
250. 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950).
251. Queener v. Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W.2d 1 (1942).
252. Anderson v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 Tenn. 106, 241 S.W.2d 93Z
(1951).
253. 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815 (1902).
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to nonunion workers, constituted an expenditure of public funds for
the benefit of private groups, and tended to create a monopoly.
25 4
254. The majority of jurisdictions are in accord. Note, 110 A.L.R. 1408
(1937). It may be, however, that public officials have discretion to consider
whether a contractor employs union labor in determining the responsibility of
a low bidder. Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 68 P.2d 559 (1937); A. H. Pugh
Printing Co. v. Yeatman, 22 Ohio C.C. 584 (1901).
